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Human Factors Influencing Decision Making 
by 
Patricia A. Jacobs and Donald P. Gaver 
Abstract 
This report supplies references and comments on literature that identifies human factors influencing 
The literature has been classified as follows (the classes are not mutually exclusive): 
decision making, particularly military decision making. 
(1) Features of human information processing 
(2) Decision making models 
(3) Non-personality factors influencing decision making 
(4) National characteristics influencing decision making 
(5) Personality factors influencing decision making 
(6) Decision making in a military organization 
The impact of the above is that much examination of the human decision making process has 
(1) Humans have limited information processing and memory capabilities. These limitations can 
occurred, and continues. In summary, this literature tends to show that 
result in biases: information processing biases can be towards an original “belief anchor,” but, in other 
cases, can be over-responsive to recent information. These are different responses that may be 
characteristic of individuals, groups, or cultures, and may even change depending upon circumstances. If 
such biases are consistent, opponent decision makers can exploit them. Training and experience can 
lessen the effects of limited information processing and memory capabilities. 
processes that humans may use to make decisions. Two such models are the naturalistic model and the 
analytic model. The naturalistic model is an adaptive decision model that, for dynamic situations, includes 
developing situational awareness, course of actions, acquiring data to confim or refute situational 
awareness and decision making. The findings are usually based on interviews. The models have been 
used to develop training procedures and in artificial intelligence applications. The analytic model focuses 
on the time of one decision; it often tries to understand the mechanisms for “unreasonable” decisions. 
(3) The environmental context in which a decision is made makes it difficult to associate personality 
traits with specific decision making behavior. 
The first part of the report is a summary of the findings of the literature survey. This is followed by 
detailed endnotes concerning the references. 
(2) Models of decision making are usually not mathematical models but rather are descriptive of the 
i 
Human Factors Influencing Decision Making 
by 
Patricia A. Jacobs and Donald P. Gaver 
Introduction 
This report supplies references and comments on literature that identifies human factors 
influencing decision making, particularly military decision making. Much examination of human 
decision making has occurred and continues. The U.S. military has sponsored many studies. Certain of 
these studies have been motivated by the need to develop decision aids to assist the decision maker; cf. 
Wickens (1992). Other studies have been motivated by the need to develop training for decision makers; 
cf. Cohen et al. (1997). There have been laboratory studies and observational studies. The laboratory 
studies use simple decision or judgment tasks on which data can be collected The observational studies 
are less controlled in the choice of task and often have a narrative aspect to them in which the decision 
maker is asked questions about his choices. 
The decision maker is influenced by many factors both internal to the decision maker and 
external to himher. The environmental context in which a decision is made can influence the choice; cf. 
Perry and Moffat (1997); Adelman et al. (1997); Hogarth and Einhorn (1991); Zeelenberg et al. (1997). 
This environmental context also makes it difficult to associate measured personality traits with specific 
decision making behavior; cf. Janis (1989) and Ajzen (1988). Further, there are many different definitions 
of personality, cf. Driskell et al. (1987). 
Internal factors that influence decision making include limited information processing and 
memory capabilities; cf. Janis and Mann (1977) and Hogarth (1987). Thus, people adopt decision making 
heuristics. These limitations can result in biases in processing information such as anchoring (undue 
weight for evidence supporting the initial hypothesis) or recency (undue weight on more recent evidence); 
cf. Wickens (1992). These errors can result in bad decisions; cf. Tolcott et al. (1989). Bad decisions can 
also be the result of staff errors; cf. Janis (1989); Kahan et al. (1989). 
capabilities; cf. Weick (1985); Cohen et al. (1996); Cohen et al. (1994); Cohen (1993); Janis and Mann 
(1977). It can also make staff work more efficient; cf. Knapp (1998). 
(the classes are not mutually exclusive): 
Training and experience can lessen the effects of limited information processing and memory 
The next section presents a summary of the literature. The literature has been classified as follows 
(1) Features of human information processing 
(2) Decision making models 
(3) Non-personality factors influencing decision making 
(4) National characteristics influencing decision making 
(5)  Personality factors influencing decision making 
(6) Decision making in a military organization (this may differ with organization and 
nationality) 
This summary is followed by detailed endnotes concerning the references. 
1 
1. Features of Human Information Processing: 
There are biases in human processing of information. 
The initial piece of evidence provides a cognitive “anchor” for the decision maker’s belief in one of 
Wickens’ (1992): Errors in processing information such as anchoring (undue weight for 
several hypotheses. 
evidence supporting initial hypothesis) or recency (undue weight on more recent evidence); 
other references Tolcott, Marvin and Bresnick (1989); Three mile island: Rubenstein and 
Mason (1979) and Sheridan (1981); Hogarth and Einhom (1978); Vincennes incident: 
Tolcott, Marvin and Bresnick (1989) and U.S. Navy (1988). 
Hogarth and Einhom (1989) 
Tolcott, Marvin, and Bresnick (1989) 
Allen (1982) 
Einhom and Hogarth (1982) 
Lopes (1982) 
Navon (1 979) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
Du Charme (1 970) 
Edwards, Phillips, Hays, andGoodman (1968) 
There can also be a tendency to overweight those cues that have occurred most recently (recency). 
There is a tendency to seek far more information than decision makers can absorb. 
Hogarth (1987) 
Samet, Weltman, and Davis (1976) 
Decision makers do not combine information in a Bayesian fashion. 
Schun (1975) 
Johnson, Cavanagh, Spooner, and Samet (1973) 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) 
Two heuristics for incorporating information: representiveness (the degree to which data “look like” 
those of a hypothesis) and availability (the ease of recalling a hypothesis) aye simplifying techniques for 
incorporating information. 
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
Operators can tend to seek information that c o n f i i  the chosen hypothesis and to avoid information 
or tests whose outcome would not confrm it. In the incident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, the 
incorrect initial formulation of a hypothesis was a major cause of the crisis. 
Tolcott, Marvin, and Bresnick (1989) 
U.S. Navy (1988) 
Schustak and Stemberg (198 1) 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1979) 
Mynatt, Doherty, and Tweney (1977) 
Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) 
2. Decision making Models: 
decision making process. 
These are not usually mathematical models but rather proposed frameworks to understand the 
Brander and Scard2 (1994): Report summarizes and reviews a range of models of decision 
making. The viewpoint is to relate different types of decision making models to the 
development of decision aids. 
There are two main themes: 
Analytical: focused upon the moment of choice and is concerned with how the decision maker selects 
a course of action. Often concerned with “errors” in decision making. 
Mellers, Schwartz, and Cooke3 (1998): Review of research from 1992-1996 concentrating on 
rational choice theory. 
Adelman, Bresnick, Christian, Gualtieri, and Minionis4 (1997): The results of an experiment 
using a Patriot simulator support a hypothesis that contextual features of a task can 
significantly effect the type of judgment processes people use both individually and in two 
person teams and in turn the type of information order effect observed. People may use 
anchoring and adjustment as a default strategy when there is no basis for interpreting 
information. 
Zeelenberg and Beattie’ (1997): People are motivated to minimize post-decision regret. As a 
result people can become risk averse or risk seeking depending on which of the possible 
choice options is the regret minimizing option. 
Kuhn and Budescu6 (1996): Subjects rate vaguely specified scenarios as more risky. 
Svenson7 (1996): Proposes a framework to understand decision making. 
Kerstholt’ (1995): Reports results of experiment with college students to assess the effect of 
false alarms on the timeliness of making a decision. 
Rogers’ (1994): An analytical approach to decision making seems to run contrary to the . 
requirements of the modem battlefield He advocates “intuitive decision making.” A 
commander must be unpredictable (to the opponent), imaginative and instinctive. Analytical 
decision making is more appropriate to the staff function and preparation of the battlefield 
Whyte and Levi” (1994): The context in which a decision is made may influence judgment. 
Adelman, Tolcott, and Bresnick (1993): Finds empirical evidence of recency effects in an 
Morgan and Henrion” (1993): Discusses various decision criteria and group decision making. 
Veit and Callero’2 (1993): Statistical analysis to find cues that influence decisions. About $5 
century ago, psychologists began developing experimental designs that made it possible to 
test judgment theories expressed in the form of algebraic functions. 
Hogarth and Einhorn13 (1992): There has been a great deal of work studying the effects that the 
order in which evidence is made available to a decision maker has on the updating of his 
experiment with Patriot air defense officers. 
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belief concerning a specific proposition or hypothesis; sometimes the first in a series of items 
dominates (primacy), sometimes the latter (a recency effect). 
Shanteau and Stewad4 (1992): Multiple linear regression methods for modeling information 
affecting judgment suggest that decision makers use relatively few cues. 
Ashton and Ashton (1990): Hogarth and Einhorn's experiments were with college students. 
There is, however empirical support for recency effects with experienced personnel. 
Maule and Mackie (1990): Deadlines to complete static tasks cause subjects to speed up 
processing of information and switch to simpler decision strategies which can use less 
information. 
Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, Hults, and Doherty (1989): Process-tracing studies of decision- 
making behavior have consistently shown that the selection of a decision strategy depends on 
task factors such as complexity of the environment and time pressure. 
Serfaty, Entin, and Tenny (1989): Evidence of recency effects with experienced personnel. 
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1988): Deadlines to complete static tasks cause subjects to speed 
up processing of information and switch to simpler decision strategies which can use less 
information. 
Hogarth (1987): Internal factors that influence decision making include limited information 
processing and memory capabilities. 
Pitz and Sachs" (1984): "A judgment or decision making (JDM) task is characterized either by 
uncertainty of information or outcome or by a concern for a person's preferences or both. 
The prescriptions for consistent behavior are generally derived from formal probability theory 
and from Expected Utility (EU) theory. Bayesian decision theory is a prescriptive theory of 
choice based on a combination of probability theory and EU theory. Numerous authors have 
demonstrated that judgments depart significantly from the prescriptions of formal decision 
theory. To account for the findings, investigators have explored the information processing 
strategies, or heuristics, that people use when making judgments. The significance of these 
inconsistencies and the status of judgmental heuristics have been a matter of dispute. The 
current paper is concerned with the degree to which prescriptive models clarify the JDM 
process itself. 
Einhom and Hogarth" (1981): There is a conflict inherent in taking action. The resolution of 
the conflict can be either avoidance or confrontation. 
Tversky (1972): People make choices using combinations of simple decision rules to find one 
alternative that meets a minimal set of requirements. 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971): Develop and test algebraic models that represent strategies for 
evaluating and combining information. 
Naturalistic: concentrates on explaining how decision makers develop an understanding of the 
problem situation and arrive at a course of action. It includes adaptive decision making in a dynamic 
situation. 
Lipshitz and S t r a~ss '~  (1997): An empirical investigation of how military officers conceptualize 
Nygren'* (1997): Empirical study of the application of how a task is framed (presented) and the 
uncertainty and how they cope with it. 
choice that is made. 
Perry and Moffat (1997): The results of an experiment involving officers with the mission of 
escorting an amphibious landing force to a designated site, found that the participants chose 
to avoid risk because of the vulnerability of the amphibious force. 
making. The viewpoint is relating different types of decision making models to the 
development of decision aids. 
Rogers’ (1994): An analytical approach to decision making seems to run contrary to the 
requirements of the modem battlefield. 
Howell’9 (1993): “Naturalistic decision making concentrates on the decision making problems 
faced by real decision makers in complex and often multi-person systems characterized by 
high levels of uncertainty, information load, time pressure, and decision importance. 
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993): Decision strategy selection is fundamentally adaptive; 
individuals select a strategy that results in fairly accurate decisions but with minimum effort. 
Tolcott (1991): “The naturalistic decision making movement has grown to the point where it is 
perhaps the dominant theme in current human factors activity in the U. S .  Military.” 
Beachm (1990): A proposed framework to understand decision making. 
Kahan, Worley, and Stasz” (1989): The commander spends time ensuring that subordinate 
commanders understand his vision; one result is faster information passing and delegation of 
responsibilities. In training situations the commanders want knowledge of the personal 
character or habits of the enemy commander. If the commander’s image of the battlefield is 
not shared with his staff, the staff may not view a datum that does not support the image as 
necessitating a change of plan; surprise could result. 
primed decision) model.” 
reasoning with preparing for potential risks. 
decision maker copes with 3 determinants of risk: lack of time, lack of information, and lack 
of control. 
Bahl and Hunt (1984): “The Bahl-Hunt model divides decision making into four distinct 
features: 1) a definition of the situation in the form of a cognitive “model”; 2) a set of 
alternatives; 3) the selection of a choice; and 4) an overt action.” 
Pugh and Kerchne? (1982): Description of some of the decision making algorithms in TAC 
BRAWLER. 
Wohl (198 1): Janis and Mann do not consider military decision making. As a result, Wohl 
proposes modifications to Janis and Mann’s paradigm to include the risks and costs of 
information seeking as opposed to giving information to the enemy, particularly information 
regarding position and intent. He also proposes a new behavior pattern called “offensive 
pursuit.” His modified paradigm is relatively independent of personality variable and 
individual differences in tolerance of stress and uncertainty. 
that one can only construct a partial model of decision making.” 
for a course of action that is “good enough” and that meets a minimal set of requirements. 
Brander and Scard’ (1994): Report summarizes and reviews a range of models of decision 
ISlein (1988): “Klein’s naturalistic decision making strategy includes his RPD (Recognition 
Cohen, Tolcott, and McIntyre (1987): Found that fighter pilots combine assumption-based 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986): “A description of behavior in a risky situation is that the 
Leedom (1979): “Surveyed the literature in cognitive and behavioral sciences and concluded 
Janis and (1977): The decision maker satisfices rather than maximizes; that is, he looks 
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3. Non-personality Factors Influencing Decision Making: 
DupuyZ (1985): Professional military experience is used to assign numbers to intangible factors such 
as leadership, trainingjexperience, and morale. 
Fatigue 
Halbert= (1998): Fatigue causes cognitive skills to degrade. 
BradshawZ6 (1995): During sleep deprivation mental ability is affected first. This results in 
decreased ability to process information and to make decisions. 
FishbumeZ7 (199 1): Physical abilities and endurance are less impaired by sleep deprivation than 
are cognitive abilities. 
Belenky, Krueger, Balkin, Headley, and Solick (1987): “Literature review pertaining to sleep 
deprivation shows that physical strength and endurance are less impaired by limited or no 
sleep than are cognitive abilities.” 
Haslam (1987): Sleep loss and military performance. 
Suedfield, Corteen, and McCormick (1986): General Lee was more fatigued than General 
Van meet and YuklZ8 (1986): “A study of World War I veterans suggested that the presence of 
Dupuy (1985): One term in the combat equations is for unit exhaustion. 
Grant. 
hunger, thirst, fatigue, ignorance of plans and idleness increases the danger from fear.” 
Time Stress 
Edland and Svenson (1993): “Effects of time pressure include a reduced focus of attention and 
an over-reliance on negative information in the decision making process or an increased 
reliance on fewer attributes or dimensions in making choices.” 
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993): Deadlines to complete static tasks cause subjects to speed 
up processing of information and switch to simple decision strategies. 
Svenson and Made (1993): “Effects of time pressure include a reduced focus of attention and 
an over-reliance on negative information in the decision making process or an increased 
reliance on fewer attributes or dimensions in making choices.” 
Wright (1974): “Under time stress, decision-making performance deteriorated when more 
rather than less information was provided” 
Thirst 
Halbed’ (1998): Cognitive skills degenerate when very thirsty or tired or in excessive heat. 
Stress 
Amsten (1998): The responses to acute uncontrollable stress include distraction and 
disorganization, the decrease in working memory abilities, and the tendency of prepotent or 
habitual responses to control behavior. “The memories of the stressful event can be better 
than usual. Humans exposed to loud noise stress are less able to sustain attention or to inhibit 
inappropriate responses. In contrast, performance of simple, well-rehearsed tasks can 
actually be better than usual after stress exposure.” 
Nygren” (1997): “Anxiety can produce a disrupting effect on the encoding of new information 
into long-term memory, which in turn may lead to inefficiencies in learning. People may 
rigidly stick with the strategy they start with. High levels of perceived stress, negative affect, 
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or framing-induced anticipated potential losses may have little or marginal effect on simple 
perceptual task performance but appear to have a potentially debilitating effect on developing 
and using more cognitively complex decision making strategies. Individuals experiencing 
these influences appear to do more than simply tunnel their focus and disproportionately 
weight negative information. Framing effects may do more than merely change focus; they 
can be so disruptive as to be detrimental to the incorporation and adoption of new information 
into dynamic decision making strategies.” 
under stress; people who are able to cope with stress successfully tend to be more introverted, 
task-oriented, and self-confident. 
Bradshaw% (1995): “Combat stress causes battle casualties. A combat stress casualty is a 
soldier rendered combat ineffective due to the psychological strain of battle. 
Payne, Bettman, and 
more nonsystematic fashion under stress.” 
Davies and Parasuraman (1982): Found that anxiety can produce a disrupting effect on the 
encoding of new information into long-term memory, which may lead to inefficiencies in 
learning. 
Sheridan (1981): Operators fail to process information that is contradictory to, or inconsistent, 
with the initially formulated hypothesis. 
Broadbent (1971): Attempts to set out a complete methodology for studying the effects of stress 
and individual differences on human performance. 
Heslegrave and ColvinZ9 (1996): Investigations of measures to predict successful performance 
(1992): “There is evidence that people scan alternatives in a 
High work load 
Knapp (1998): Human performance proficiency models; task input-throughput modeling. ARI 
at Fort Huachuca has developed human factors models for work load in commander and staff 
work in brigade and below. 
capabilities or the organization lacks adequate resources to make a good decision, they will 
make a crucial policy decision without examining the pertinent information carefully. He 
proposes different personality traits that influence decision making; he states that there are 
few generalizations that can be made about the interaction of personality and the situational 
factors of the decision. He discusses factors associated with poor decision making in the 
civilian world. 
Decision Science  application^^^ (1982): Proposal to develop a simulation of pilot workload 
capabilities 
Sheridan (1981): Operators fail to process information that is contradictory to or inconsistent 
with the initially formulated hypothesis. 
Janis31 (1989): When managers believe that the complexities of the issues exceed their 
Experience 
Reiswebe? (1997): “There is ample evidence to suggest that battle command skills are a 
function of not only raw talent, but years of practice, experience and maturation” 
Cohen and FreemanM (1996): More experienced decision makers buy themselves more time for 
resolving uncertainty by a) explicitly asking how much time they have before they must 
commit to a decision and b) estimating this time more precisely. Results of an experiment in 
which the decision was whether or not to engage an incoming gunboat found that less 
experienced decision makers tend to prematurely reject alternative hypotheses. 
\ 
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Cohen, Freeman, Fallesen, Marvin, and Bresnick3’ (1996): Report assesses the merit of training 
methods to improve an officer’s critiquing and correction skills for battlefield planning. 
Cohen, Adelman, Tolcott, Bresnick, and Marvin (1994): Experts have more automatic 
responses; experts are more proactive in their planning; experts are less likely to act 
prematurely or to wait too long. In a study of ship-based anti-air engagement decisions, more 
experienced officers tended to wait longer before deciding to engage than less experienced 
officers. The more experienced officers also adopted contingency plans (enabling very rapid 
engagement in case of a hostile act). 
competence that provides the knowledge required to make intuitive decisions.” 
experienced officers not only waited longer before engaging an unknown contact but adopted 
contingency plans (enabling very rapid engagement in case of a hostile act). More 
experienced officers were better able to generate alternative interpretation of cues regarding 
target identity or intent. 
reaction time, visual search, and simple memory tasks are affected by individual differences 
in age and intelligence, by alcohol, and by practice.” 
Kahan, Worley, and Stasz” (1989): The commander spends time ensuring that subordinate 
commanders understand his vision; one result is faster information passing and delegation of 
responsibilities. In training situations the commanders want knowledge of the personal 
character or habits of the opposing commander. If the commander’s image of the battlefield is 
not shared with his staff, the staff may not view a datum that does not support the image as 
necessitating a change of plan; surprise could result. 
Rogers’ (1994): “There is a fundamental link between training, experience and technological 
Cohen (1993): In the context of Naval anti-air warfare decisions, it was found that more 
Rabbitt and Maylo? (1991): “Reviews studies of ways in which performance in choice 
Dupuf (1985): There is a training and/or experience factor in the combat potential. 
Staff 
Knapp (1998): Human performance proficiency models; task input-throughput modeling. ARI 
at Fort Huachuca has developed human factors models for work load in commander and staff 
work in brigade and below. It is important to assign people to tasks based on training. Each 
person has a finite capacity to perform tasks. 
FOSS~~  (1997): The staff must be forward looking helping the commander to anticipate. 
Rogers’ (1994): The staff can provide a safety check to intuitive decision making. 
Kahan, Worley, and Stasz21 (1989): A commander’s perceived incompetence of staff slows 
decision making. The commander spends time ensuring that subordinate commanders 
understand his vision; results of a common vision are faster information passing and 
delegation of responsibilities. In training situations the commanders want knowledge of the 
personal character or habits of the enemy commander. If the commander’s image of the 
battlefield is not shared with his staff, the staff may not view a datum that does not support 
the image as necessitating a change of plan; surprise could result. 
Janis and Mann23 (1977): Concurrence seeking from policy advisors can lead to disregarding 
conflicting information about the future success of a current operation. 
Training 
Knapp (1998): Human performance proficiency models; task input-throughput modeling. ARI 
at Fort Huachuca has developed human factors models for work load in commander and staff 
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work in brigade and below. It is important to assign people to tasks they have been trained 
for. People have a finite capacity to perform tasks. 
Cohen, Freeman, Fallesen, Marvin, and Bresnick3’ (1996): Report assesses the merit of training 
methods to improve an officer’s critiquing and correction skills for battlefield planning. 
Bradshaw26 (1995): “Training under realistic conditions builds necessary soldier trust in 
themselves and the organization.” 
Rogers’ (1994): “Training time with troops and teaching at military schools are the crucial jobs 
in the development of future battlefield commanders. Commanders will have to lead and 
maneuver soldiers on the training battlefield to develop intuition. It is important in training to 
develop situations that allow individuals to make intuitive decisions, which means 
experimentation and tolerating mistakes.” 
Hunt and Phillips3* (199 1): “Training can modify behavior. Skill development techniques 
under high stress situations involve over learning through extended practice to produce 
automatic responses.” 
Van Fleet and Yuk13’ (1986): “The most important factors in controlling fear are: devotion to 
cause, leadership, training and materiel.” 
Weick (1985): Training can modify behavior; some appropriate skill development techniques 
under high stress situations involve over learning through extended practice. Training can 
speed the decision making process. 
factors, although that influence could be reduced with training. 
Gaeth and Shanteau (1984): Found that judgments were adversely influenced by irrelevant 
Janis and Mann23 (1977): Prior training can improve decision making in emergency situations. 
Leadership skills 
Foss3’ (1997): “The future battlefield will be less forgiving of slow decisions than ever before. 
Good commanders anticipate. Not only do they anticipate the enemy, they anticipate their 
subordinates’ needs and provide help and support to facilitate overall mission 
accomplishment.” 
Reiswebeq3 (1997): “An officer Personnel Management System study conducted by the 
Department of History at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, found 
that successful leaders are able to assess rapidly changing situations and continually 
assimilate large quantities of conflicting information.” 
ARI Newslettera (1996): The Center for Leadership and Organizations Research (CLOR) is 
administering measures of transformational and transaction leadership for inclusion in the 
baseline officer longitudinal data set. 
Bradshag (1995): “A commander can directly decrease a unit’s combat stress casualties 
though his personal activities, proper treatment of casualties and leading by example.” 
Oke~huku~~ (1994): “The purpose of this study is to provide a descriptive comparison of the 
relative influence of certain Western-conceptualized managerial abilities, traits and 
motivations in assessing managerial effectiveness in the PRC and Hong Kong relative to a 
Western society such as Canada.” 
Rogers’ (1994): “The use of instinct or intuition in decision making is related to lack of 
information and time available and is more useful in battle command than in battle 
preparation. If a commander ties himself to a command post, his decisions will be slow and 
predictable. Information received at the command post may not be sufficient to paint an 
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accurate tactical picture and valuable time could be lost trying to confirm the actual combat 
situation. The commander cannot afford to wait until all information has been gathered and 
processed.” 
Smith, Misumi, Tayeb, Peterson, and Bond4’ (1989): “Study using shop-floor work teams and 
their immediate supervisors in Britain, the United States, Hong Kong and Japan. Where 
individualistic values prevail a leader’s options may be expected to include the option of 
exerting direct pressure towards a goal. Where collectivist values prevail, leadership is more 
likely to emphasize reciprocal influence processes.” 
Jaques, Clement, Rigby, and Jacobs (1986): Single skill mentioned most often by 41 general 
officers was consensus building to ensure they get the resources needed to carry out the 
decision. Consensus may need adjustment, opportunity to adapt, accommodate to sharp 
situation changes, “getting everyone on board.” 
effectiveness in combat situations. Interpersonal relations are less important to both leaders 
and to subordinates in crisis situations. 
Isenberg (1985): Observations of 6 senior managers; they create new alternatives, keep options 
open, delay decision points, search for more information, and include more people in the 
decision making function. 
Yukl and Van Fleet” (1982): “Aspects of leadership found effective: performance emphasis; 
inspiration; role clarification; provide clear directions; criticism-discipline; planning and 
problem solving was important in combat situations. Friendly interpersonal relations become 
less important both to leaders and to subordinates in crisis situations.” 
Van Fleet and Y ~ k l ~ ~  (1986): Planning and problem solving are important for leadership 
Quantity and quality of information I 
Nygren’* (1997): “It is well documented that the way a static choice task is “framed” 
(presented) can dramatically alter choice behavior, often leading to observable preference 
reversals. A study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that framing can introduce 
affective components to the decision making process and can influence, either favorably 
(positive frame) or adversely (negative frame) the implementation and use of decision 
making strategies in dynamic high workload environments. Results indicate that negative 
frame participants were significantly impaired in developing and employing a simple optimal 
decision strategy relative to a positive frame group.” 
demonstrated that decision makers are generally averse to taking risks with imprecisely 
specified (vague) probabilities and are even willing to pay a premium to avoid vagueness. 
Kerstholt (1995): Kerstholt conducted an experiment in which the college students were asked 
to monitor the fitness level of a fictitious athlete and intervene if necessary. If the fitness 
level decreased, the subjects could either intervene directly or ask for diagnostic information. 
The subjects were also presented with false alarms and the time needed for intervention was 
varied. The subjects tended to ask for diagnostic information rather than act directly. The 
greater the false alarm rate, the longer the time until the subjects intervened. 
Rogers
g 
(1994): The more information a commander obtains, the more reluctant he may be to 
make a decision; he may become overloaded or delay making a decision in the belief that he 
may receive a vital piece of information. Someone has to set course, decide on C O k  
decision maker to the possibility that important information is missing from a problem 
description.” 
Kuhn and Budescu (1996): Numerous empirical studies on risky decision making have 
Payne, Bettman, and (1992): “The apparent completeness of a display can blind a 
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Task Complexity 
Johnson and Bruce4’ (1998): “Study analyzes a large sample of decisions made by individuals 
in UK offcourse betting markets. The investigation focuses on the comparative impacts of 
complexity defined in terms respectively of alternatives and attributes. The results suggest 
that the risk strategy employed is affected by task complexity. Complexity does not affect the 
size of risk accepted but altemative- and attribute- based complexity together influence the 
propensity to accept greater degrees of risk. In addition, the effect of attribute-based 
complexity on risk taking appears to be modified by the use of risk-hedging strategies.” 
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson30 (1992): “A hypothesis is that the more complex a decision 
problem, the more people will use simplifying decision heuristics.” 
4. National Characteristics Influencing Decision Making: 
Blood4 (1998): His organization has done work on forecasting battlefield attrition of US forces 
in combat against various opponents. As part of this effort they have tried to make some 
estimates of soft factors in combat outcomes. 
Halbert4’ (1998) and Morrowa (1998): National Ground Intelligence Center rates factors such 
as leadership, training, readiness, morale, cohesion, and ability to execute logistics for foreign 
ground forces. The rating scale is from 1 tolO. There are criteria for each rating. A group of at 
least three experts scores the factors for each country. The National Ground Intelligence 
Center has panel of experts rate factors such as leadership, training, readiness, morale, 
cohesion, and ability to execute logistics for foreign ground troops. 
desire to minimize casualties. Some other nations view troops as cannon fodder. The concern 
commanders have for the soldiers or sailors influences the decisions made in combat. 
Blood, Rotblatt, and Marks49 (1996): Naval Health Research Center in San Diego assembled 
subject matter expert panel to assess some soft factors: societal homogeneity (measured by 
religious and ethnic homogeneity), technical sophistication (measured by amount of 
electricity used), and troop commitment (measured by length of enlistment and percent of 
GNP used to support military). A composite factor for various countries is determined in a 
study to estimate US casualties in conflict. 
Bond and Smith” (1996): “The general functions that effective leaders must carry out appear to 
be universal across nationalities. The specific ways in which these functions are expressed 
differs.” 
Yates, Lee, and Shin0tsuka5’ (1996): Study of overconfidence in judgment tasks of mainland 
Chinese, Japanese, Taiwan Chinese, and Americans. The judgment task is to specify the 
correct answer to a general knowledge question. The subjects were then asked to assess how 
correct their answer is. 
Ungvarsky (1998): The attitude of commanders towards troops. The US has a current strong 
Kaplan5’ (1991): Contains references of human factors type studies in different countries. 
Goralski and Freeburg (1987): “The Nazis surveyed abilities of slave labor. “During WWII the 
German Reich commissioner of labor, Fritz Sauckel surveyed each foreign group (slave 
labor) working at synthetic plants and compared the results with German workers.” The 
report concluded the French were 80-90 percent as efficient; Belgian 75-85; etc.” 
inflicting capability for each side of historical battles. Calculates combat effectiveness scores 
of one nationality versus another for historical battles. 
Dupu? (1985): Describes calculating measure of combat effectiveness called casualty 
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5. Personality Factors Influencing Decision Making: 
Winter, Stewart, Duncan, John, and Klohned3 (1998): “After reviewing classic and current 
conceptions of trait (as measured by questionnaires) and motive (as measured by the 
Thematic Apperception Test [TAT] or other imaginative verbal behavior), the authors 
suggest that these 2 concepts reflect 2 fundamentally different elements of personality- 
conceptually distinct and empirically unrelated.” 
Ackerman and H e g g ~ t a d ~ ~  (1997): “The authors review theories of intelligence, personality 
and interest as a means to establish potential overlap. Evaluations of relations among 
personality construct, vocational interests and intellectual abilities lead them to propose that 
the development of personality-interest-intelligence traits proceeds along mutually causal 
lines; that is abilities, interests, and personality develop in tandem.” 
attitude and ambiguity intolerance determine choice behavior. The presence of ambiguity 
may often be interpreteaperceived as risk. Decision m&ers who are less risk averse and 
have more tolerance for ambiguity display greater confidence in their choice. Individuals 
with a low tolerance for ambiguity may interpret lack of information or lack of precise 
information as risk and take action that incurs cost without yielding benefit. Risk seeking and 
ambiguity tolerant individuals may take no action where such action may be necessary.” 
Rei~webe?~ (1997): Successful battle commanders have the traits of cognitive complexity and 
behavior complexity. 
Atwater, Dionne, Avolio, Camobreco, and Lau” (1996): One of a series of studies of cadets at 
the Virginia Military Institute. Among the characteristics found to be of clear consequence to 
leadership are cognitive ability, conscientiousness, self-confidence, energy/activity level, 
values, and tolerance for stress. There is work on attempting to find an instrument that 
measures the characteristics, cf. Lord and Hall (1992), Army Research Institute (1996), and 
Avolio, Dionne, Atwater, Lau, Camobreco, Whitmore and Bass (1996). 
Avolio, Dionne, Atwater, Lau, Camobreco, Whitmore, and BassS7 (1996): Study of measures of 
leadership conducted at Virginia Military Institute. “Early studies of leadership emergence 
and effectiveness concentrated on linking leader personality traits to various leader 
effectiveness or performance measures. Generally, clusters of characteristics seemed to 
differentiate effective from ineffective leaders, though no specific trait or characteristic could 
be deemed essential.” 
Ghosh and Ray” (1997): Reports results of experiments using MBA students. “Both risk 
Schwager and Evans (1996): Measures of leadership at US Military Academy. 
Spector and O’Connells8 (1994): “Negative affectivity locus of control and type A personality 
have all been suggested as playing an important role in the job stress domain. Negative 
affectivity (NA) is defined as the tendency for an individual to experience a variety of 
negative emotions across time and situations. Locus of control is a personality variable that 
concerns people’s generalized expectancies that they can or cannot control reinforcements in 
their lives. People who hold expectancies that they control reinforcements are considered to 
be internals, and people who hold expectancies that outside forces or luck controls 
reinforcements are considered to be externals. There are two aspects to type A personality: 
impatience-irritability and achievement striving.” Paper reports results of a study assessing a 
cohort of graduating college seniors while in school and again after graduating and beginning 
a job. The results show that personality relates to incumbent reports of job stressors and 
strains. 
Robertson and Kinder5’ (1993): Results of a study to assess the criterion-related validity of 
Lord and Hallm (1992): “There is a need for an effective method for measuring leadership 
some personality variables are reported. 
behavior. This report considers the Cadet Performance Report (CPR). CPR is a 12- 
dimensional leadership behavior rating system currently used to develop and evaluate the 
leadership performance of USMA cadets. The report examines the use of CPR to measure 
cadet leadership behavior.” 
Driskell and Salas6’ (199 1): “It does not appear promising to use personality measures to 
predict unit effectiveness.” 
Jacobs and Jaques6* (1991): Research on Meyers-Briggs Temperment Indicator (MBTI) 
suggests that it can be used to infer individual preference types for information source 
processing and cognitive style. 
McGregor, Eveleigh, Syler, and Davis63 (1991): “The type A behavior pattern has been 
characterized by the following traits: A sense of time urgency; Competitive achievement 
striving; High levels of aggressiveness andor free-floating hostility. In contrast, Type B 
individuals are defined by the relative absence of these Type A characteristics.” 
Byrne and Reinharta (1989): “Study of people in Australian Public Service. Type A behavior 
pattern is associated with more working weeks/year, more discretionary work hours/week, 
and more days/ year spent on occupation-related travel. This time commitment is 
instrumental in facilitating occupational achievement among those with a type A behavior 
pattern.” 
Hunt, Krzystofiak, Meindl, and Yousry6’ (1989): Decision makers of a particular cognitive 
style tend to prefer advisors of the same style. 
Janisa (1989): Proposes different personality traits that influence decision making; he states 
that there are few generalizations that can be made about the interaction of personality and 
the situational factors of the decision. Discusses factors associated with poor decision 
making in the civilian world 
Ajzed7 (1988): “Both theory and empirical findings negate the possibility of measuring general 
attitudes or personality traits and effectively/usefully using the resulting scores to predict any 
single behavior under a set of circumstances. There is low predictive validity of personality 
characteristics. The search for explanations of narrowly defined behaviors in terms of global 
personality traits has been difficult. There is little ability to predict specific or narrowly 
defined behaviors from the knowledge of people’s personality characteristics. Behaviors 
depend too much on the specific situation.” 
Driskell, Hogan, and Salas (1987): “There are many different definitions of personality. It is 
difficult to discover consistent relationships between personality variables and stress 
resistance given the scarcity of reliable measures of stress proneness or stress vulnerability.” 
They concluded that traits did account for appreciable variance in the perception of 
leadership. 
Nutt (1986): Studied 197 financial decision makers and found associations between information 
source preferences and risk aversion. 
Streufert6* (1986): Investigates personality traits associated with risky behavior: traits are type 
A personality; high tolerance for incongruity between past experience and contemplated 
risks; low cognitive complexity. Investigated personality traits that resulted in the likelihood 
Lord, Devader, and Niger  (1986): Did a meta-analysis review of the leader trait literature. 
of adopting risky actions with highly adverse consequences. Personality traits are a Type A 
(success driven, time driven, competitive), high tolerance for incongruity between past 
experience and contemplated risks; low cognitive complexity (less integrative 
multidimensional information processing). 
of personality characteristics of great leaders is sparse. 
found the following: ethical conduct, personal integrity; leadership effectiveness and 
achievement; willingness to assume responsibility; courage, daring; maintaining coordination 
and team work; ascendance, dominance and team work; emotional balance and control; 
intellectual skills; social and interpersonal skills; technical skills; group task supportiveness. 
Isenberg (1985): Describes observations of six senior managers. Leaders have a high tolerance 
for ambiguity and perceived and understood novelty. The managers focus on defining 
problems so solutions can be found. They create new alternatives, keep options open, delay 
decision points, search for more information, and include more people in decision making 
functions. 
Mitroff (1983): Utilized a classification scheme that recognized that individuals differ in the 
way that they acquire information and in the methods that they use to process data. 
Sanders and M a l k i ~ ~ ~  (1982): “Type A behavior is characterized primarily by the combination 
of a highly competitive achievement orientation, a sense of time urgency, and excessive 
hostility in response to frustration. Type As seem to have a strong investment in 
demonstrating that they can deliberately cause desired consequences-that is, they have a high 
need for control. The desire to master their environment is presumed to underlie Type As 
concern with competition, their strong reaction to being thwarted by frustration, and their fear 
of missing deadlines or wasting time.” 
betting situation. 
phenomenon from its environment. Individuals showing high field independence were 
thought to prefer problem solving approaches which emphasize detail and basic relationships. 
The field dependent person shows less ability (or perhaps less inclination) to separate objects 
from their environment. Field dependent individuals would prefer more global, perhaps 
intuitive, approaches to problem solving.” 
Glass (1977): “Demonstrated that Type A individuals displayed greater reactions than did Type 
Bs to uncontrollable events that were very salient, whereas the opposite was true for events of 
low salience.” 
Glass, D., Snyder, M., and Hollis, J. (1974): “Type A individuals displayed greater impairment 
on a task requiring a response delay than did Type Bs. The type A subjects consistently 
overestimated the passage of time and responded before the delay interval had timed out.” 
McKenny and Keen (1974): “Have both an information-gathering and an information- 
evaluation dimension of style. The information-gathering dimension differentiates receptive, 
data-sensitive (i.e. analytic) individuals from perceptive data-filtering (i.e. intuitive) 
individuals. The information-evaluation dimension differentiates systematic structured 
decision makers (i.e. analytic) from holistic, trial and error (i.e. intuitive) problem solvers. 
Combination of the two dimensions results in four cognitive styles: systematic-perceptives, 
systematic-receptive, intuitive-perceptives and intuitive-receptives.” 
Suedfield, Coteen, and McCormick (1986) and Huntford (1980): Knowledge and understanding 
Van Fleet and Y u M ~ ~  (1986): A study of traits and skills of leaders in military organizations 
Behling, Gifford, and Tolliver (1980): Association between cognitive style and risk taking in a 
Henderson and Nutt (1980): “Field independence is the ability to separate an object or 
14 
6. Decision Making in a Military Organization: 
Kahan, Worley, and StaszZ1 (1989): Commander spends time ensuring that subordinate 
commanders understand his vision; one result is faster information passing and delegation of 
responsibilities. In training situations the commanders want knowledge of the personal 
character or habits of the enemy commander. If the commander’s image of the battlefield is 
not shared with his staff, the staff may not view a datum that does not support the image as 
necessitating a change of plan; surprise could result. 
(members perform for money) in terms of the modes of compliance obtained within them. 
Military organizations are normative (members perform out of duty) and to a lesser extent 
coercive. Normative organizations stress values more than utilitarian organizations would. A 
study of traits and skills of leaders in military organizations found the following to be 
important. 
Van Fleet and (1986): Business and industrial organizations tend to be heavily utilitarian 
Ethical conduct, personal integrity 
Leadership effectiveness and achievement 
Willingness to assume responsibility 
Courage, daring 
Maintaining coordination and team work 
Ascendance and dominance 
Emotional balance and control 
Intellectual skills 
Social and interpersonal skills 
Technical skills 
Group task supportiveness 
Leaders in combat situations plan for enemy actions, effectively organize and schedule unit 
activities and take decisive action in dealing with immediate crises. 
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will be different, and may even reverse, depending on the order in which evidence is perceived.” 
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Kleinmuntz, B. “Why we still use our heads instead of formulas: toward an integrative approach,” 
Psychological Bulletin, 107(3), (1990) pp. 296-310. 
Slovic, P., B. Fischhoff, and S. Lichtenstein. “Perceived risk: psychological factors and social 
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Slovic, P., B. Fischhoff, and S. Lichtenstein. “Behavioral decision theory,” Annual Review of 
PS~CholO~y, 28 (1977) pp. 1-39. 
Sniezek, J. A. “Judgments of probabilistic events: remembering the past and predicting the future,’’ 
Journal of ExDerimental Psychology: Human PerceDtion and Performance, 6 (1980) pp. 695-706. 
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. “The law of small numbers,” Psvchological Bulletin, 76 (1971) 
pp. 105-110. 
*Brander, G. N. and N. Scard. “Models of Human Decision Making” DRA/CIS/CSS5/CR94024/1.0, 
Defence Research Agency, Famborough, Hampshire, GU14 6TD, United Kingdom, Oct. 1994. 
“The report summarizes and reviews a range of models of human decision making. The 
viewpoint of the report is relating different types of decision-making models to the development of 
decision aids. This report addresses the various different .types of models and their purposes and provides 
a flavour of the alternative approaches over the past few decades, leading up to the current naturalistic 
approaches. The focus of the review and of the models it describes is on decision making or the cognitive 
behavior of experts in response to uncertain information usually under time stress and wherever possible 
in the complex open and adversarial system domain which is the arena for military decisions and actions. 
analytical and naturalistic approaches. 
The report concentrates on the differentiation between what appear to be two main themes: 
Analytical strategies tend to focus upon the moment of choice and are concerned with how the 
decision maker selects a course of action. This selection process requires the consideration of more than 
one option. Additionally, analytical approaches usually assume that the decision maker is rational, in that 
he will always seek to optimize the outcome by choosing the option that will produce the maximum 
benefit . 
a personal level, as well as in their work. Naturalistic strategies concentrate on explaining how decision 
makers develop an understanding of the problem situation and arrive at a course of action. Real world, 
real-time problems are often characterized by uncertainty, time pressure and risk. Situation understanding 
is critical and naturalistic approaches offer models of how human decision makers construct their 
situation assessments. 
The relationships and similarities between the models are discussed with respect to the 
development of human expertise and with reference to what cognitive processes might occur during an 
evolving decision scenario. The naturalistic approach is selected as offering the most intuitively elegant 
explanation of human decision making strategies. 
dominant theme in current human factors activity in the US Military;” (Tolcott, M. A. “Understanding 
and aiding military decisions” Paper presented at the 27’h International Applied Military Psychology 
Symposium Stockholm, Sweden, June 1991). “The models beginning to emerge from this work, which 
has a great emphasis on field research, are empirical, descriptive, and have much explanatory power.” 
models” in Symposium on Modelling and Simulation of Avionics systems and Command and Control 
Systems. AGARD (NATO) Conference Proceedings No. 268, National Technical Information Service. 
Oct. 15-19, 1979: “surveyed the literature in cognitive and behavioral sciences and concluded that one 
can only construct a partial model of decision making”. 
Naturalistic decision approaches emphasize the way people make decisions in their daily lives, on 
The naturalistic decision making movement has grown to the point where it is perhaps the 
Leedom, D. K. “Representing human thought and response in military conflict simulation 
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WON (Wohl, J. G. “Force management decision requirements for Air Force tactical command 
and control” IEEE Transactions on Svstems. Man and Cvbemetics, 1981, Vol. SMC-11 no. 9, pp618- 
639):”introduces the SHOR paradigm as basically an extension of the stimulus-response paradigm of 
classical behaviorist psychology and providing explicitly for the necessity to deal with two realms of 
uncertainty in the decision making process: 
a) Information input uncertainty, which creates the need for hypothesis generation and 
evaluation 
b) Consequence of action uncertainty, which creates the need for option generation and 
evaluation 
Wohl is supportive of Janis and Mann’s conflict theory paradigm. He suggests that three determinants of 
decision making behaviour clearly and directly affect the creation, evaluation and selection of hypotheses 
and options by influencing information seeking behavior. These three determinants are 
a) Risks: information about potential losses 
b) Alternatives: information about availability of potential new alternatives 
c) Time: information about deadline pressures or time available for deliberation 
Janis and Mann do not consider military decision making. As a result, Wohl proposes 
modifications to Janis and Mann’s paradigm to include the risks and costs of information seeking as 
opposed to giving information to the enemy, particularly information regarding position and intent. He 
also proposes a new behavior pattern called “offensive pursuit.” His modified paradigm is relatively 
independent of personality variable and individual differences in tolerance of stress and uncertainty.” 
Klein, G. A., “Naturalistic models of C3 decision making” In Science of Command and Control: 
Coping with Uncertainty. Johnson, S .  E. and Levis, A. H. (Eds.). 1988 Washington, DC: ATCEA 
International Press: “Klein’s naturalistic decision making strategy includes his RPD (Recognition primed 
decision) model. The major components of the RPD model are 
a) Recognition of situations 
Feature matching 
Story generation 
Managing the situations: by incremental decision making or by developing plans 
Expectancies 
Typical actions 
b) Serial evaluation 
COA options are generated and evaluated serially until one that seems to be 
satisfactory is identified; satisfying strategy 
c) Progressive deepening. 
Evaluating a COA by imagining the implementation of that action 
Klein does not advocate the RPD model as the only model of human decision making, merely as 
one of the strategies used by experts under time stress and uncertainty.” 
MacCrimmon, K. R. and Wehrung, D.A Taking Risks, The Management of Uncertainty, Free 
Press 1986: “description of behavior in a risky situation is that the decision maker copes with 3 
determinants of risk: 
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a) Lack of time 
b) Lack of information and 
c) Lack of control 
For some characteristics of people that account for variapce in the behavior.” See Wickens, C. D. 
Engineering Psychology and Human Performance 2”* edition, Harper Collins Publishers, New 
York, NY, 1992. 
“Janis and Mann address the sort of decisions in which the decision maker is not, or 
cannot be an expert. It is focused on decisions in which it is far from clear what courses of action 
are likely to be appropriate. 
It is unknown if the naturalistic decision strategies persist at higher levels of command 
To augment the fidelity of combat simulations to include representative human decision 
making responses it is probably unnecessary to have models, which fully emulate human decision 
making. What is required are models which exhibit responses typical of the intelligent behavior 
of experts in responding to familiar situations and which can make typical error of situation 
assessment of response activation. See Morgon’s Adaptive Decision Maker as an option.” 
Morgon, P. D. “Simulation of an adaptive behavior mechanism in an expert decision maker” 
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics Vol. 23, No. 1, 1993, pp. 65-76. 
Mellers, A. A. Schwartz, and A. D. J. Cooke. “Judgment and decision making,” Annual Review of 3 
Psychology, 49 (1998) pp. 447-477. 
rational choice theory and argues that changes may be needed” 
“Review of research on judgment and decision making from 1992-1996. It concentrates on 
Adelman, L., T. A. Bresnick, M. Christian, J. Gualtieri, and D. Minionis. “Demonstrating the effect of 
context on order effects for an Army air defense task using the Patriot simulator,” J. of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 10 (1997) pp. 327-342. 
support for recency effects with experienced personnel: 
Ashton, R. H. and A. H. Ashton. “Evidence-responsiveness in professional judgement: effects of positive 
versus negative evidence and presentation mode,” Organization Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
Serfaty, D., E. Entin, and R. Tenny. “Planning with uncertain and conflicting information.” In Johnson, S .  
E. and Levis, A. H. (Eds.), Science of Command and Control: Couing with Comulexitv, (pp. 91-lOO), 
AFCEA International Press, Fairfax VA, 1989. 
Adelman, L., M. A. Tolcott, and T. A. Bresnick. “Examining the effect of information order on expert 
judgment,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 56 (1993) pp. 348-369. 
Adelman, L. and T. A. Bresnick “Examining the effect of information sequence on expert judgement: an 
experiment with Patriot air defense officers using the Patriot air defense simulator,’’ Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 53 (1992) pp. 204-228. 
Hogarth and Einhom’s experiments were with college students. There is, however empirical 
46 (1990) pp. 1-19. 
Adelman, L., T. A. Bresnick, M. Christian, J. Gualtieri, and D. Minionis. “Demonstrating the effect of 
context on order effects for an Army air defense task using the Patriot simulator,” J. of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 10 (1997) pp. 327-342. 
The authors did an experiment using a Patriot simulator. The experiment involved deciding if an 
incoming aircraft was friend or foe. “The results of the experiment support a hypothesis that contextual 
features of a task can significantly affect the type of judgment processes people use, both individually and 
in two person teams and, in turn, the type of information order effect observed. The context of the 
information can alter meaning of information, leading to information reinterpretations People may use 
anchoring and adjustment as a default strategy when there is no basis (e.g. explanation) for interpreting 
information. The participants in the experiment saw the Patriot’s system identification of an incoming 
aircraft. Participants had minimal hesitation in disagreeing with the system’s recommendation. Training 
protocols and decision support algorithms are supposed to eliminate order effects.” Another paper of 
possible interest is 
Pennington, N. and R. Hastie. “A theory of explanation-based decision making.” In G. A. Klein, J. 
Orasanu, R. Calderwood, and C. E. Zsambok (Eds.), Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods, 
(pp. 188-201). Ablex, Norwood NJ, 1993. 
Zeelenberg M. and J. Beattie. “Consequences of regret aversion 2: additional evidence for effects of 
feedback on decision making,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 72 (1997) pp. 
63-78. 
“People are motivated to avoid or minimize post-decisional regret. As a result people can 
become risk averse or risk seeking, depending on which of the possible choice options is the regret 
minimizing option. This motivation exerts impact on their decisions, because the possibility of future 
regret is anticipated and taken into account when making decisions and because experienced retrospective 
regret promotes decisions that make this regret disappear (the so-called regret management). There might 
be cases, however, in which one can argue that regret results in bad decisions or in reduced learning from 
experience (because feedback is avoided)” 
Kuhn K. M and D. V. Budescu. “The relative importance of probabilities, outcomes, and vagueness in 
hazard risk decisions,” Orpanizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 68 (1996) pp. 301-317. 
“Numerous empirical studies on risky decision making have demonstrated that decision makers 
are generally averse to taking risks with imprecisely specified (vague) probabilities and are often even 
willing to pay a premium to avoid vagueness. 
attitude toward vagueness is an important, distinct and independent factor in decision behavior. 
informed; the observed bias results from an aversion to choosing options with missing information that 
could consequently lead to greater blame or regret if the decision proves to be a poor one. 
magnitude of the resulting outcomes; or even what all the possible outcomes may be. 
6 
Individual attitudes toward risk and toward vagueness are not closely associated suggesting that 
Vagueness is only aversive if it makes decision makers feel comparatively less knowledgeable or 
Vagueness includes: being unable to specify exact probabilities for all consequences; the 
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The effects of vagueness on the outcome dimension of risks have received much less attention 
than has the probability dimension. In Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) vagueness of information about 
outcomes is modeled by a probability distribution on values around a point estimate. 
The authors do a study to investigate the joint effects of vagueness about both the probability of a 
loss and the actual magnitude of the loss on evaluations of hazard risks. 
The authors found a clear tendency for the subjects to rate vaguely specified scenarios as more 
risky.” 
Svenson, 0. “Decision making and the search for fundamental psychological regularities: what can be 
learned for a process perspective,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65 (1996) 
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pp. 252-267. 
“Author proposes differentiation and consolidation theory to provide a framework to discuss 
developments in decision making and to study regularities in decision making 
(Following the paper is commentary on Svenson’s paper by H. R. Arkes 
Arkes, H. R. “The temperature of diff con theory,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 65 (1996) pp. 268-271. 
considered to be unmotivated. Instead they are a consequence of the normal operation of the human 
information processing system.) 
of a decision process is to create an alternative that is sufficiently superior in comparison to its 
competitor(s) through restructuring and application of one or several decision rules. The structuring 
principles are not derived from one rule only (e.g. subjective expected utility (SEU) or dominance) but 
from a number of different rules contingent on the situation and the person in that situation. This process 
is named differentiation. The corresponding postdecision process in support of the chosen alternative is 
called consolidation.” 
Reference: 
Busemeyer, J. R. and J. T. Townsend “Decision field theory: a dynamic-cognitive approach to decision 
making in uncertain environment,” Psvchological Review, 100 (1993) pp. 432-459. 
“Diff Con theory assumes that sufficient differentiation protects the decision maker from external 
(e.g. poor outcome) and internal (e.g. change of own values) threats to the preference of the chosen 
alternative. The goal in Diff Con theory is to achieve differentiation in a balanced way in which pros and 
cons together contribute to a sufficient degree of differentiation. Diff Con theory assumes that a 
minimization of effort principle is at work. It is assumed that retrospectively questioning a chosen 
alternative or changing it generally requires effort, which a decision maker wants to minimize. However, 
predecision differentiation also requires energetic effort, which leads to a readiness to learn from 
decisions and routinize them. Following a decision several threats against the choice appear (loosing the 
good aspects of the non-chosen alternative, stuck with the poor aspects of the chosen alternative, 
unpredicted events, new perspectives on the decision in retrospect, etc.) which have to be handled Diff 
Con theory assumes that one way of handling this post-decision regret or dissonance is to continue 
differentiating the chosen alternative after the decision in what is now called consolidation. 
Hot cognition errors have come to mean motivated mistakes. Cold cognitive errors are 
The purpose of a decision process is to select one of two or more decision alternatives. The goal 
Diff Con theory uses an alternative x attribute representation.” 
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Kerstholt, J. H. “Decision making in a dynamic situation: the effect of false alarms and time pressure,” 
J. of Behavioral Decision Making, 18 (1995) pp. 18 1-200. 
Kerstholt conducted an experiment in which the college students were asked to monitor the fitness level 
of a fictitious athlete and intervene if necessary. If the fitness level decreased, the subjects could either 
intervene directly or ask for diagnostic information. The subjects were also presented with false alarms 
and the time needed for intervention was varied. The subjects tended to ask for diagnostic information 
rather than act directly. The greater the false alarm rate, the longer the time until the subjects intervened. 
a decision strategy depends on task factors such as complexity and time pressure; see 
Ford, J. K., N. Schmitt, S .  L. Schechtman, B. M. Hults, and M. L. Doherty. “Process tracing methods: 
contributions, problems, and neglected research questions,” Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 43 (1989) pp. 75-117. 
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Process-tracing studies of decision-making behavior have consistently shown that the selection of 
In the book 
Payne, J. W., J. R. Bettman, and E. J. Johnson. The AdaDtive Decision Maker. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, England, 1993. 
The authors conclude that decision strategy selection is not just contingent but fundamentally adaptive: 
individuals select a strategy that results in fairly accurate decisions, but with a minimum amount of effort. 
Deadlines to complete static tasks cause subjects to speed up processing of information and 
switch to simpler decision strategies which can work with less information; see 
Payne, J. W., J. R. Bettman, and E. J. Johnson. “Adaptive strategy selection in decision making,” J.f 
Exuerimental Psychology: Learning, Memorv and Cognition, 14 (1988) pp. 534-552. 
Maule, A J. and P. Mackie. “ A componential investigation of the effects of deadlines on individual 
decision making.” In Borcherding, K., Larichev, 0. I., and Messick, D. M. (Eds.) ContemDorarv Issues in 
Decision Making” North -Holland, Amsterdam, 1990. 
Rogers, C. T. “Intuition: an imperative of command,” Militarv Review, (March 1994) pp. 38-50. 
becomes overloaded or delays making a decision in the belief that if he waits he will receive the vital 
piece of information that tends never to come. Advances in technology are actually speeding up the 
actions and slowing down the decision making in any decision/ action cycle. An analytical approach to 
decision making seems to run contrary to the requirements of the modem battlefield 
making the decision. The stresses and strains of the battlefield, however, can undermine this rationality, 
whether it is fear or lack or sleep. The need for a safety check on intuitive decisions made by a military 
commander is vital. 
There is a fundamental link between training, experience and technological competence that 
provides the knowledge required to make intuitive decisions 
Maneuver warfare can be broken down into 2 components. First, the physical ability to move and 
apply force faster than the enemy, which in simple terms relates to equipment and technology and second 
on the speed of decision making. If all things are equal, then decision making speed relative to that of the 
enemy becomes all important. 
“The more information a commander gets, the more reluctant he is to make decisions. He either 
Intuitive decision making is high risk and relies on a degree of rationality in the individual 
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A commander must be unpredictable, imaginative, and instinctive and must weigh the factor of 
surprise as critical to his plans. To achieve this, a commander needs initiative or “command pull” based 
on intuition rather than “staff push” which is akin to the more analytical decision making. Analytical 
approach to decision making has its place before the battle when time is not pressing and there is the 
ability to analyze problems exhaustively. 
The use of instinct or intuition in decision making is related to lack of information and time 
available and is more useful in battle command than in battle preparation. If a commander ties himself to 
a command post, his decisions will be slow and predictable. Information received at the command post 
may not be sufficient to paint an accurate tactical picture and valuable time could be lost trying to confrm 
the actual combat situation. The commander cannot afford to wait until all information has been gathered 
and processed. 
Maneuver warfare implies that you accept and encourage confusion and the accompanying 
“friction of war”. It is with this uncertainty that the analytical approach to command has difficulty. It 
craves for certainty that is not there in warfare, and this craving leads to a requirement for more 
information, which is in itself time consuming. 
There are two basic methods of decision making: Decisions based on an exhaustive analysis of 
factors; and one based on intuition which emphasizes decisions based on the ability of a commander to 
rapidly process information gained from knowledge and experience. The demand for certainty on the 
battlefield leads to a demand for more information. The danger is that the commander may believe that 
he never has sufficient information to make a decision and so he delays that decision. 
In a battle command situation it is important that commanders are not bombarded with 
information but have sufficient knowledge themselves to ask the right questions of their staff. 
Training time with troops and teaching at military schools are the crucial jobs in the development 
of future battlefield commanders. Commanders will have to lead and maneuver soldiers on the training 
battlefield to develop intuition. It is important in training to develop situations that allow individuals to 
make intuitive decisions, which means experimentation and tolerating mistakes. 
Commanders must be technologically competent with their weapon systems and their equipment. 
They must know the capabilities, limitations and the most effective means of employment for every 
system they control. To develop intuition there is a need to concentrate on warfighting with emphasis on 
uncertainty and speed of thought. 
Intuition is the product of a well-organized body of experience and knowledge that can be rapidly 
processed to make quick decisions. This speed of decision making is obviously vital for the successful 
prosecution of warfighting where the decision cycle is time competitive. Any decisions made by intuition 
are the products of an individual and are subject to that individual’s rationality. There is thus a need for 
some kind of safety check in the process.” 
Whyte G. and A. S.  Levi. “The origins and function of the reference point in risky group decision 
making the case of the Cuban missile crisis,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 7 (1994) pp. 243- 
260. 
such context effect is the reference level or standard of comparison. The authors use historical 
documentation from the Cuban missile crisis to examine the role of the reference point.” 
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“The context in which a decision is made may influence judgment and ultimately choice. One 
Morgan, M. G. and M. Henrion. Uncertaintv: A Guide to Dealing with Uncertainty in Oualitative Risk 
“Policy analysis deals with problem situations that are ill defined and that have been termed 
The following alternative Decision Criteria that may be applied in policy analysis to manage risk 
11 
and Policv Analysis Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
messy (Ackoff, R. L. Redesigning the Future Wiley, New York 1974) 
Utility based criteria 
Deterministic Benefit-cost 
Probabilistic benefit-cost (Expected value) 
Cost effectiveness 
Bounded Cost 
Maximize multi-attribute utility 
Minimize chance of worst possible outcome 
Rights based criteria 
Zero Risk: Independent of the benefits and costs and of how big the risks are, 
eliminate the risks, or do not allow their introduction 
Bounded or constrained risk 
Technology based criteria 
Best Available Technology 
There are circumstances that involve a single clearly identified and authorized decision maker. 
However they are the exception. Most policy decisions involve complex political and organizational 
interactions with a variety of individual and institutional actors. 
interests are involved, it may become difficult or impossible to apply a single coherent formulation and 
decision criterion to a decision process. 
When process considerations are dominant and many different actors with different objective and 
Ten commandments for good policy analysis 
1. Do your homework with literature, experts and users 
2. Let the problem drive the analysis 
3. Make the analysis as simple as possible, but no simpler 
4. Identify all significant assumptions 
5. Be explicit about decision criteria and policy strategies 
6. Be explicit about uncertainties 
7. Perform systematic sensitivity and uncertainty analysis 
8. Iteratively refine the problem statement and the analysis 
9. Document clearly and completely 
10. Expose the work to peer review 
People making judgements in the presence of uncertainty use heuristic procedures: 
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Availability: probability judgement is driven by the ease with which previous 
Representativeness: when worthless specific evidence is given, prior probabilities 
Anchoring and adjustment: A natural starting point or anchor is selected as a first 
Occurrences of the event have occurred, can be recalled, or can be imagined to occur 
are ignored 
approximation to the value of the quantity being estimated and then this value is adjusted to 
reflected supplementary information. 
The explicit treatment of uncertainty in policy analysis may be worthwhile in the following 
circumstances 
1. The decision maker has significant risk-aversion 
2. Uncertain information from several sources must be combined 
3. Decisions about whether to buy additional information to reduce uncertainty must be 
made 
4. The loss function is highly asymmetric in an uncertain quantity 
5 .  Some important uncertain quantity has a highly asymmetric distribution 
6. Thorough examination of the uncertainty about a quantity may change the “best 
estimate” 
7. Consideration of uncertainties can be used as a guide for model refinement 
8. There is a need to assess the reliability of the analysis to help decision makers know 
how much weight to give to it 
9. The policy analysts feel an ethical responsibility to be clear about the limitations of 
their analysis” 
Veit, C. T. and M. Callero. “Criteria for validating human judgments and developing behavioral 
representation models.” Prepared for the Society for Computer Simulation, 1993 Summer Computer 
Simulation Conference, July 19-21, 1993, Boston Mass. RAND paper P-7823 RAND, Santa Monica CA, 
1993. 
models of human judgments. The model (alternatively theory or rule) is the interpretation of the 
judgment data. These interpretations are often formulated into algorithms and incorporated into 
simulations. For example, combat simulation models contain rules for determining military war plans, 
target engagement, force deployment, and other commanders’ decisions. The validity question is: how is 
it possible to know if the algorithms actually reflect the commander’s or other judge’s perceptions? The 
theme of the paper is that interpretations of human judgments should be treated as hypotheses and 
formulated in such a way that they can be tested and rejected if empirical evidence does not support their 
claims. 
About ?4 century ago, psychologists began developing experimental designs that made it possible 
to test judgment theories expressed in the form of algebraic functions. This approach included functional 
measurement (Anderson (1970, 1981)) and conjoint Measurement (Krantz et al. (1971); Krantz and 
Tversky, (1971); Veit (1978)) Extensions of this approach produced what is called modem measurement 
(for example Bimbaum (1974) Birnbaum and Veit (1974a)” 
“This paper discusses criteria for human judgment validation. The focus of this paper is on 
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References: 
Psvchology Monograph, 1974 102,543. 
Birnbaum, M. H., and C. T. Veit, “Scale-free tests of an averaging model for the size-weight illusion” 
PerceDtion and Dsvchouhvsics, 1974a, 16,276-282. 
Krantz, D. H., R. D. Luce, P. Suppes, and A. Tversky, Foundations of Measurement Academic Press New 
York 1971 
Krantz, D. H., and A. Tversky. “Conjoint-measurement analysis of composition rules in psychology,” 
Psvcholonical Review, 1971 78 15 1-169. 
Review, 1970.77 pp153-170. 
Birnbaum, M. H. “The nonadditivity of personality impressions” J. of Experimental 
Anderson, N. H. “Functional measurement and psychophysical judgment.” Psvchological 
Anderson, N. H. Foundations of Information Integration Theory Academic Press 1981. 
Veit, C. T. “Ratio and subtractive processes in psychophysical judgment” J.f 
ExDerimental Psychology 107 (1978) ,1, pp81-107. 
“The conceptualization of human judgment process proposes that people transform stimulus 
information ( S )  into subjective values by the function (H) referred to as the psychophysical, 
psychological, or utility function. Subjective values are then combined to form a subjective response (r) 
by the integration function (1) (the algebraic specification of the judgment combination process); the 
subjective response is then transformed by the judgment function (J) into an overt response, R. 
The focus in modem measurement is testing theories about subjective events that occur after a 
respondent is presented with information and before he produces a response. The idea is to formulate 
experimental designs that make it possible to discover the algebra that underlies judgments, which in turn 
allows knowledge of the subjective values. When an adequate experimental design is employed, different 
algebraic theories predict different orderings of the magnitudes of judgements to different situations. 
After responses to all situations are obtained, the ordering predicted by different theories can be compared 
with the data’s order. The subjective scale values (the algebraic model’s parameters) are derived from the 
judgment data in accord with the algebraic model; model parameters are estimated by least squares or 
maximum likelihood, etc. 
Many modeling problems can be termed complex because there are multiple events that occur in 
parallel or sequentially within a system. When human judgements are used in complex system analyses 
to determine and measure the effects of such sequential or parallel processes on overall system outcomes, 
the measurement problem is not only to credibly capture how people think about what affects their ability 
to do their job but also to credibly interlink sequential or parallel judgments made by the same or different 
subject matter experts within a system. The Subjective Transfer Function (STF) Approach (Veit and 
Callero, 1981; Veit, et al., 1984) was developed to achieve these goals in complex system analysis” 
Veit, C. T., and M. Callero, “Subjective transfer function approach to complex system analysis.” The 
RAND Corporation, R-27 19-AF, 198 1. 
Veit, C. T., M. Callero, and B. J. Rose, “Introduction to the subjective transfer function approach to 
analyzing systems.” The RAND corporation, R-31021-AF, 1984 
“A sketchy example involving soldiers operating a forward area air defense system (FAADS)  is 
given. The FAADS firing decisionmakers participated in developing the structure and factor definitions. 
Their focus was on what they thought would happen based on their training and experience, not 
necessarily on what should happen based on published doctrine. The factors determined to be of 
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importance in determining the likelihood an aircraft is an enemy were: the last event the air defense unit 
experienced; the aircraft’s actions; the air defense warning level; and the “enemy or “friendly” report they 
receive from an Advanced Identification Device (AID) that has a known validity.” 
Hogarth R. and H. Einhom. “Order effects in belief updating: the belief adjustment model,” Cognitive 13 
PSYChOlogv, 24 (1992) pp. 1-55. 
“A great challenge to those interested in decision making has been the extreme sensitivity of 
judgment and choice to seemingly minor changes in tasks. There has been a great deal of work studying 
the effects that the order in which evidence is made available to a decision maker have on the updating of 
his belief concerning a specific proposition or hypothesis. Sometimes the first in a series of items 
dominates (primacy), sometimes the latter (a recency effect)” 
evidence presented to them. The basic structure of the belief updating model proposed is an anchoring- 
and adjustment process. This model is proposed to explain how different ordered sequences of the same 
information can result in different judgements. There are assumptions concerning the encoding of 
evidence, the mode of processing and the adjustment weight.” 
This paper proposes mathematical models for how people update their beliefs given the numerical 
Shanteau, J. and T.R. Stewart. “Why study expert decision making? Some historical perspectives and 14 
comments,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 53 (1992) pp. 95-106. 
“The conclusion from psychometric research is that experts are lacking validity and reliability 
and that more information increases confidence but not accuracy. 
Extensive use of multiple regression methods for modeling judgement began in the 1950s. The 
evidence shows that linear models of experts and nonexperts alike contain a small number of significant 
factors. A robust finding in research on human judgment is that relatively few cues account for virtually 
all of the systematic variance. 
experts is that they rely on heuristics in making judgments. Although these heuristics are often 
functional, they can lead to systematic biases or errors. 
subjects to experts. 
cognitive psychology has elicited many special ways by which experts think and solve problems;” 
In the decision-making literature, a common explanation for the low level of performance by 
There has been much debate about whether commonly accepted findings extend from student 
Most judgment decision making research has focused on the deficiencies of experts. Research in 
Chi, M. T. H., R. Gleser, and M. J. Fan. The Nature of Exuertise. Erlbaum, HiUsdale NJ, 1988, 
Pitz, G. F. and N. J Sachs. “Judgement and decision: theory and application,” Annual Review of 1s 
PSvCholony, 35 (1984) pp. 139-63. 
“A judgment or decision making (JDM) task is characterized either by uncertainty of information 
or outcome or by a concern for a person’s preferences or both. The prescriptions for consistent behavior 
are generally derived from formal probability theory and from Expected Utility (EU) theory. Bayesian 
decision theory is a prescriptive theory of choice based on a combination of probability theory and EU 
theory. 
Numerous authors have demonstrated that judgments depart significantly from the prescriptions 
of formal decision theory. To account for the findings, investigators have explored the information 
processing strategies, or heuristics, that people use when making judgments. The significance of these 
inconsistencies and the status of judgmental heuristics has been a matter of dispute. The current paper is 
concerned with the degree to which prescriptive models clarify the JDM process itself. 
Functional measurement methodology developed by N. H. Anderson (1970) and social judgment 
theory (Hammond et al 1975) use algebraic models to show how judgments are related to stimulus 
information. Models have also been used to test hypotheses about the details of information processing 
(Wallsten and Barton 1982, Wilkening and Anderson 1982). 
Payne 1982 suggests that a person might use any of a number of strategies to amve at a judgment 
or decision. Beach and Mitchell (1978) suggest that the choice of strategy depends on the cognitive effort 
that it requires. There exists, therefore, a higher level process of cost-benefit analysis (Payne 1982) that 
might be used to select a strategy. 
The prescriptions of EU theory and its extensions can be presented in algebraic form. There are 
other algebraic models of judgement and decision that are not derived from normative considerations. 
The best known is N. H. Anderson’s information integration theory (IIT: Anderson 198l), which uses 
algebraic formulations to describe judgments based on multiple sources of information. Hammond’s 
social judgment theory (SJT: Hammond et al 1975) based on Brunswik’s (1952) lens model, makes use of 
correlation and regression analysis to relate judgments to environmental variables. SJT generally uses 
external measurements of environmental cues. Both theoretical approaches are concerned with the 
process by which information from different sources is combined. Most algebraic models rely on some 
version of a linear combination rule, at least as a first approximation. 
Many variables other than those to which a person is asked to respond to can be shown to affect 
the judgment.” 
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Annual Review of Psvcholonv, 32 (1981) pp.53-88. 
that represent strategies for evaluating and combining information (see Slovic and Lichtenstein 197 1). 
The conflict inherent in taking action, as distinct from conflict in judgment, occurs because action implies 
greater commitment. Such commitment induces conflict in several ways: 1. Whereas the existence of 
alternatives implies freedom to choose, the act of choice restricts that very freedom. Hence keeping ‘one’s 
options open’ is in direct conflict with the need to take action, 2. Given a set of nondominated 
alternatives, conflict arises because each alternative has both advantages and disadvantages. 3. Unlike 
judgments, actions are intimately tied to notions of regret and responsibility. 
As with the resolution of conflict in judgment, conflict resolution in action can involve either 
avoidance or confrontation.” 
Reference: 
Slovic, P. and S. Lichtenstein. “Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of 
information processing in judgment,” Organ. Behav. Hum. Perform. 6 (1971) pp. 649-744. 
“Much work in judgment and choice involves the development and testing of algebraic models 
Lipshitz, R. and 0. Strauss. “Coping with uncertainty: a naturalistic decision-making analysis,” 17 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 69 (1997) pp. 149-163. 
military officers) conceptualize the uncertainty, which they encounter in their work? 2) How do decision 
makers cope with their uncertainty? 3) Are there systematic relationships between different 
conceptualizations of uncertainty and different methods of coping? 
“This study is an empirical investigation of three questions: 1) How do decision makers (e.g. 
The authors develop three related conceptual propositions 
Proposition 1: Uncertainty in the context of action is a sense of doubt that blocks or delays action. 
Proposition 2: The uncertainty with which decision makers must cope depends on the decision-making 
model, which they employ. 
Proposition 3: Different types of uncertainty can be classified according to their issue (i.e. what the 
decision maker is uncertain about) and source (i.e. what causes this uncertainty). Three basic issues are 
outcomes, situation and alternatives. Three basic sources are incomplete information, inadequate 
understanding, and undifferentiated alternatives.” 
intelligent avionics: a cognitive auuroach, Falls Church, VA, Decision Science Consortium “found that 
fighter pilots combine assumption-based reasoning with preparing for potential risks: 
If their sensors confirm the presence of the threat but are inconclusive regarding its classification, 
pilots adopt a worse case assumption [under] the rationale.. .that the failure to classify the threat is itself 
evidence that the threat is a new system, and therefore likely to be more dangerous than previously known 
threats. On the other hand, if available information is inadequate to confirm the existence of a threat, 
pilots tend to make a best case assumption until more definite information is obtained [under] ... the 
rationale.. .that actions taken to avoid the threat would almost certainly expose the aircraft to risk from 
other known threats. Nevertheless, even in this situation, limited action, e.g. speeding up the plan, might 
be taken to reduce risk from the unconfrmed threat. 
making were asked to relate a decision making situation in which they were involved. The authors assert 
M. S .  Cohen, M. A. Tolcott, and J. McIntyre (1987) Disulav techniques for pilot interactions with 
Lipshitz and Strauss “conducted an experiment in which military officers in a class on decision 
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that the result of the experiment support models of naturalistic decision making. Decision makers use 
both situation assessment coupled with serial option evaluation and concurrent choice. The heuristic 
assumes that decision-making begins with an attempt to understand, recognize or make sense of the 
situation. If this attempt is successful, decision makers initiate a process of serial option evaluation, 
which they complement, if time permits, by mentally simulating the selected option. When making sense 
of the situation fails, decision-makers experience inadequate understanding to which they respond by 
seeking additional information. If additional information is not available decision makers experience lack 
of information, to which they respond by assumption-based reasoning or by forestalling. If decision 
makers generate two or more good enough options they experience conflict to which they respond by 
weighing pros and cons or by forestalling. Finally, if decision makers either fail to identify a single good 
enough option, or to differentiate among several good enough options they resort to suppression, 
forestalling, or the generation of a new alternative.” 
Other references: 
recognizing, critiquing, and correcting,” Human Factors, 38 (1996) pp. 206-219. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65 (1996) pp. 48-60. 
making.” In C. Zsambok, and G. A. Klein (Eds.) Naturalistic Decision-Making (pp. 292-303), Erlbaum, 
Hillsdale NJ, 1997. 
Lipshitz, R. “The road to ‘Desert Storm’: Escalation of commitment and the rational vs. single option 
paradigms in the study of decision-making,” Organization Studies, 16 (1995) pp. 243-263. 
Cohen, M. S . ,  J. T. Freeman, and S .  Wolf. “Meta-recognition in time stressed decision-making: 
Lipshitz, R. and 0. Bar Ilan. “How problems are solved: reconsidering the phase theorem,” 
Lipshitz, R. and 0. Ben Shaul. “Schemata and mental models in recognition-primed decision- 
Nygren, T. E. “Framing of task Performance strategies: effects on performance in a multiattribute 18 
dynamic decision making environment,” Human Factors, 39 (1997) pp. 425-437. 
behavior, often leading to observable preference reversals. A study was conducted to examine the 
hypothesis that framing can introduce affective components to the decision making process and can 
influence, either favorably (positive frame) or adversely (negative frame) the implementation and use of 
decision making strategies in dynamic high workload environments. Results indicate that negative frame 
participants were significantly impaired in developing and employing a simple optimal decision strategy 
relative to a positive frame group. 
shows that individuals may exhibit reversals of preferences when the same decision making situation with 
identical outcomes and likelihoods is described in different ways. For example when a decision situation 
is framed in terms of what could be gained, people often choose options reflecting risk-averse behavior, 
but when a decision situation is framed in terms of what could be lost, they tend to be more risk- 
acceptant.” 
References for naturalistic decision making models: 
Stokes, A. F. and Kite, K. (1994) Flight Stress: Stress, Fatigue, and uerformance in Aviation Avebury, 
England: Avebury Aviation. 
“It is well documented that the way a static choice task is “framed” can dramatically alter choice 
Framing refers to a rather robust finding in the judgment and decision making literature that 
Nygren, T. E. and Fischer, U. (1996) “The role of risk in pilots’ perceptions of problem situations”. In 
Proceeding of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 40”’ Annual Meeting (p. 1258) Santa Monica, 
CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. 
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L. Mann (1992) “Stress, affect and risk-taking” In J.F. Yates (Ed.) Risk-taking Behavior (pp201-230). 
New York: Wiley. 
Klein, G. (1996) “The effect of acute stressors on decision making” In J.E. Driskell and E. Salas, (Eds.) 
Stress and Human Performance (pp49-88) Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993) “Determinants of risk-taking: behavioral and economic views” Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty vol. 6 pp49-73. 
a problem situation has been initially defined either by or for the decision maker. In the subsequent 
framing stage, however, what is critical is that the decision maker must examine the relevant potential 
outcomes and their corresponding contingencies and place them in a psychological context relative to 
some personal and subjective reference point. Once this reference point has been established, it 
determines whether outcomes are psychologically perceived as being either positive or negative, gains or 
losses, or good or bad, despite their objective values.” 
References: 
Svenson, 0. and Maule, A. J. (1993) Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making 
London: Plenum. 
Edland, A. and Svenson, 0. (1993) “Judgment and decision making under time pressure: studies and 
findings” In 0. Svenson and A. J. Maule (Eds.) Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and 
Decision Making (pp. 27-40). London: Plenum. 
information in the decision making process or an increased reliance on fewer attributes or dimensions in 
making choices. 
Study conducted with students. Positive: win more points doing task; Negative loss fewer points 
doing task. One task is tracking. 
Negative mood and increasingly stressful situations often lead to decisions based on evaluation of 
a restricted set of attributes or dimensions, particularly negative information. 
Anxiety can produce a disrupting effect on the encoding of new information into long-term 
memory, which in turn may lead to inefficiencies in learning. People may rigidly stick with the strategy 
they start with.” 
References: 
“Framing refers to a different component stage of the predecision process that should occur after 
“Effects of time pressure include a reduced focus of attention and an over-reliance on negative 
Davies, D. R. and Parasuraman, R. (1982) The Psvchologv of Vigilance London: Academic. 
“High levels of perceived stress, negative affect, or framing-induced anticipated potential losses 
may have little or marginal effect on simple perceptual task performance but appear to have a potentially 
debilitating effect on developing and using more cognitively complex decision making strategies. 
Individuals experiencing these influences appear to do more than simply tunnel their focus and 
disproportionately weight negative information. Framing effects may do more than merely change focus; 
they can be so disruptive as to be detrimental to the incorporation and adoption of new information into 
dynamic decision making strategies.” 
l9 Howell, W. C. “Engineering psychology in a changing world,” Annual Review of Psvcholonv, 44 
(1993) pp. 23 1-263. 
Naturalistic decision making “focuses on the problem faced by real decision makers in complex, 
usually multiperson systems characterized by high levels of uncertainty, information load, time pressure, 
and decision importance (i.e. stress). The term naturalistic was coined to differentiate this general task 
domain and the approach advocated for studying it, from the more traditional axiomatic and heuristic 
paradigms used in laboratory research. The basic idea is that experienced decision makers reduce the task 
situation to manageable proportions by converting it into a pattern-recognition problem. Interviews and 
other knowledge elucidation techniques have been used.” 
*’ Beach, L. R. Image Theory: Decision Making in Personal and Organizational Contexts. John Wiley and 
Sons, New York, 1990. 
“A nonquantitative approach to decision making. It does not seem easy to implement in a combat 
model. 
The value image consists of the decision maker’s prescriptive and proscriptive values, standards, 
ideals, precepts, beliefs, moral, and ethics, which are collectively, called principle. These are imperatives 
that serve as rigid guides for establishing the “rightness” or “wrongness” of any particular decision. 
for where he or she should be going. The constituents of the trajectory image are called goals. Goals can 
be concrete, specific events, such as getting a particular job. They can also be abstract states, such as 
being a success in one’s field or being happy. In the latter case, concrete events, called markers, serve as 
indicators of goal attainment. 
The strategic image consists of the various plans that have been adopted for attaining the various 
goals that the decision maker is pursuing. Each plan is a sequence of actions that begins with goal 
adoption and ends with goal attainment. Plans are abstract strategies. Their concrete behavior 
components are called tactics. Tactics are specific actions that are intended to facilitate implementation 
of a plan and to produce progress toward their goal. Inherent in plans is a forecast of the future that may 
result (1) if a particular candidate plan is adopted to attain a specific goal, or (2) if implementation of a 
particular plan on the strategic image is begun, or, once begun, if it is continued. 
The trajectory image consists of the decision maker’s agenda for the future, the strategic outline 
There are two kinds of decisions: 
Adoption decisions which are about adoption or rejection of candidates as constituents of 
Progress decisions which are about whether a particular plan on the strategic image is 
the value, trajectory or strategic images; 
producing satisfactory progress toward attainment of its goal. 
maker relies upon recognition or identification of the present context to define a subset of the constituents 
from his or her images as relevant toe the decision at hand. This is called framing. The necessity for 
action arises within a framed context, and if in the past some course of action proved successful, that 
same course of action, called a policy, will be used again. If no policy exists, appropriate goals and plans 
must be adopted. 
In order to interpret events and to bring relevant knowledge to bear upon them, the decision 
There are two tests by which adoption and progress decisions are made. 
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The compatibility test assesses whether the features of a candidate for adoption violate 
the relevant (framed) constituents of the various images and whether forecasts based upon the 
constituents of the strategic image violate the relevant constituents of the trajectory image. 
of competing candidates to further the implementation of ongoing plans, attain existing goals, and 
comply with the decision maker’s principles. 
The Profitability test which apples only to adoption decisions, assess the relative ability 
The object of the compatibility test is to screen out the unacceptable. The object of the profitability test is 
to seek the best. 
For an adoption decision about a single candidate the compatibility test dictates that if the 
(weighted) number of violations exceeds the ‘rejection threshold’, the candidate is rejected; otherwise it is 
accepted. Violations are all-or-nothing (compatible/incompatible), and the rejection threshold is the upper 
limit of the decision maker’s willingness to tolerate violations for the decision at hand. 
For an adoption decision involving two or more alternative candidates, the compatibility test is 
essentially a screening process. 
For a progress decision the compatibility test dictates that if the number of violations of the 
trajectory image by the forecast from the strategic image exceeds the rejection threshold, the existing plan 
is rejected and a new plan is sought to replace it; otherwise the existing plan is retained. The profitability 
test does not apply to progress decisions.” 
Kahan, J. P., D. R. Worley, and C. Stasz. Understanding Commanders’ Information Needs Rand 21 
Publication Series R-3761-A, RAND, Santa Monica CA, June 1989. 
LTC McGinnis, TRAC-Monterey, supplied reference. 
(Em) commanders. The study takes a social psychological view of the command-post information 
processing that serves the information needs of commanders.” The study is observational. 
by a skilled and experienced individual to achieve prescribed goals”; (Bloom, J.N. and AM. Farber, 
and Reauirements of Command (ARC). Volume I: Summarv ReDort, Technical Report 1-191, The 
Franklin Institute Research Laboratories, Philadelphia Pennsylvania, April 1967.) 
rather than needed information or data.. 
“Report of a study to assess command and control information needs of Echelons Above Brigade 
“Effective command is largely a process whereby men, machines, and materiel are manipulated 
“Studies of command and control tend to focus on tasks rather than on process or on available 
Information needs of the commander: 
Decisionmaking and planning process drive a commander’s information-seeking 
Situational framework shapes a commander’s information needs. 
Different commanders have varying information needs. 
behavior and his information needs. 
A commander’s information needs are rarely specific pieces of data that can be transmitted 
directly from outside the headquarters; instead they are information items whose development requires 
the explicit participation of headquarters staff and subordinate commanders. Examples of information 
items are: 
Estimate of enemy intentions, predicated on a belief about the enemy’s overall strategic 
Evidence that headquarters staff understand the commander’s intent and can use that 
Alternative courses of action and plans, with prospects and risks for each 
Evidence that subordinate commanders understand and are prepared to implement the 
objectives supported by intelligence information 
intent to prepare alternative courses of action and plans 
commander’s concept of operations. 
AU of these elements appear to be necessary for the commander to maintain a coherent image of 
his battle. When the information is consistent with that image, then much of the information supplied to 
the commander can be in a standard form; the commander will ‘spot check” that standard information 
with detailed follow-up questions to test the validity of the image. However, information indicating to the 
commander that his image is in need of revision generates requests for specific items that are highly 
dependent on the perceived anomaly. 
the commanders concept of operations), the commander may visit the subordinate to reconcile the 
violation of expectations or to revise the subordinate’s understanding. 
ask for specific detailed information with which to refine his understanding, will assess the validity of the 
intelligence report, and will obtain revised estimates of enemy intent consistent with the intelligence 
report. 
change objectives or postures; often visits subordinate commands to verify the accuracy of the 
information. 
situation. 
Elements of situational framework that drive commander’s information needs. 
If a subordinate takes an unexpected action (implication subordinate does not understand 
If an intelligence report is inconsistent with commander’s image of battle field, he will 
Commander receives updates about capabilities of his own forces, especially before they 
Commander is constantly looking for weaknesses in both the enemy and his own 
The context of the command decision (e.g. stage of war, political considerations) 
Organizational structure of the command post. 
Specialists present 
Communication among staff (which staff receive specific information and how they 
process information) 
I Commander’s image is the mental representation of the situation and drives his information needs. 
His identification of the nature of the problem (e.g. the center of gravity of the battle and the 
culminating point) determines his information needs Different commanders have different images. 
Differences do not necessarily predict how good a commander is or gauge the quality of his decisions. 
The interaction between the commander and his immediate subordinates 
commander will require less information. A subordinate who understands the commander can 
communicate information more efficiently.” 
If commander believes his subordinates understand him and are competent, then the 
I 
Keegan, J. The Mask of Command, Viking, New York, 1987 
“Keegan labels the essential elements of command action as knowing and seeing. By 
“knowing,” Keegan means having a general background knowledge that provides a rich contest. By 
“seeing” he refers to having a dynamic image of the battle field that leads the commander to understand 
what needs to be done. 
situation: Mission (from higher headquarters), Enemy (location, strength, and disposition), Terrain (and 
weather), Troops (friendly available, location, strength and disposition), and Time horizon 
Commanders make assessments about the personal characteristics of their subordinates and the 
enemy and these assessments can strongly influence their intent. A subordinate commander believed to 
be weak will not be entrusted with critical positions. 
Commanders also want knowledge of the personal character or habits of the enemy commander 
in training situations. If it is known the enemy trains for night missions, then commander will expect one. 
The primary cause for inappropriate information is the misunderstanding of the commander’s 
image of the situation; this misunderstanding can lead to a mistake in the understanding of the 
commander’s intent. This can lead to the presentation of inappropriate courses of action. The result is 
time lost. 
A second cause of inappropriate information content is the difficulty of expressing uncertainty. 
Better intelligence officers present alternative estimates of enemy intention only if, in their opinion 
different situations might warrant different decisions. 
unit, information Concerning other units may not get passed. 
decision making within the civilian world. Experts in most fields tend to solve problems and to make 
decisions by recognizing existing situations as instances of things with which they are familiar on the 
basis of their past experience. Thus, they know what data to examine and what steps to take to achieve a 
goal. Expertise is difficult to study and teach. 
ME’IT-T s the standard h y  acronym for the five essential characteristics that define a battle 
Only so much information can be passed. If detailed information is asked for concerning one 
Military expertise in the command post is in many ways analogous to expertise in complex 
There are three Information Modes 
Pipeline: For “normal operations to ensure that staff and subordinates share the 
commander’s image; used when the commander believes the image is valid and for the continuation of 
the plan; checks the validity of the image; 
When the commander believes the image is valid it alerts the commander to a possible transition to tree 
mode. It can occur between the regular information conveyance times; 
Tree: When the image is broken, it is to repair and reconstruct the image. When a new 
plan is being constructed, to begin a new plan. 
When information that is potentially an alarm reaches a subordinate, that person must decide whether to 
shift to alarm mode by causing a nonscheduled information transfer or to remain in pipeline mode by 
holding the information for the next scheduled transfer. Knowledge of the commander’s image is the 
most important requirement for making that decision. 
Information Mode and the quality of information 





When tree mode is being employed, a commander is more likely to concentrate on information that is 
relatively certain. This is because he is in the position of constructing or reconstructing his image of the 
battlefield and is ascertaining what is known. Tree mode requires an explicit demand-pull from the 
commander. 
Information concerning image building is concentrated on two EAB command tasks: 
Mission planning-i.e. searching for and selecting a plan that is expected to achieve the 
Mission effectiveness monitoring-i.e. continually reassessing the suitability of the 
objectives; and 
promulgated plan. 
The action element is similarly composed of two control tasks: 
Resource-order generation, or the construction of resource orders that are expected to 
Compliance monitoring, or determining how closely the demanded activities are being, 
give rise to the demanded resource activity; and 
and will be, achieved 
Mission planning is a complex iterative process that relies heavily on the tree mode of 
information search and exchange. Once a plan is constructed, it is promulgated via standardized pipeline 
modes, and the system transits to both mission effectiveness monitoring and resource-order generation. 
monitoring reveals that the commander’s image is no longer valid or that the plan is in need of revision, 
then an alarm is triggered that sends the system back to mission planning 
The promulgated plan is translated by the staff into a set of resource orders. The resource-order 
generation process is, like mission planning, an iterative one that requires the use of tree mode. 
Information is typically passed between subordinates. The commander intervenes if it becomes apparent 
that his image is not understood. 
echelon commands) and resources not under direct control (e.g. intelligence assets) comply with the plan. 
This monitoring is generally supported by pipelines, supplemented by alarms. 
because they are not recognized as necessitating a change of plan” 
Mission effectiveness monitoring typically uses pipeline modes of information exchange. If 
The resource-order compliance-monitoring stage assesses how well subordinates (e.g. lower- 
Although alarms are simple in concept, they can fail when the commander’s image is not shared 
Timeliness Detail Uncertainty 
According To Schedule Aggregated Moderate 
(typically 6 to 24 hours) down 2 echelons 
Immediate Highly Detailed, Likely to be Very high 
Highly Focused 
Varies with Item and Selective use of Likely to concentrate on 
Situation “telescope” Lower uncertainty Items 
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Pugh, G. E. and R. M. Kerchner. “Representation of C31 effects in combat simulation,” Proceeding 49” 22 
MORS, June 1982, pp. 53-66. 
Engineering oriented decision making 
“TAC BRAWLER is a multiple aircraft simulation that utilizes artificial intelligence methods to 
represent the decision processes of pilots and flight leaders in many aircraft. TAC BRAWLER can be 
viewed as a multiple player expert system in which a major part of the expert knowledge is represented in 
the form of a hierarchical value structure. 
The actual human decision processes take place in what appears to be a very disorderly sequence. 
An individual who is concerned with an important decision typically spends some of his time trying to 
think of alternative courses of action; he spends some of his time trying to estimate and evaluate potential 
outcomes; he spends some of his time trying to improve his interpretation of the situation; and he spends 
a considerable amount of time in apparently non-productive “worry” as his thought seen to recycle 
through essentially the same thought processes. Moreover, he does not go through these different parts of 
the process in any standard sequence such as might be dictated by the logical structure of the problem. 
Instead he is always trying to direct his thoughts to whatever part of the problem he perceives as most 
likely to yield a quick solution. 
output information for each of the processing steps-without regard for the actual time sequence in which 
the steps maybe performed. 
Situation perception: all aspects of awareness and understanding of the current state of the 
environment. 
Situation assessment: risks and opportunities within the perception have been identified and 
assessed in terms of the goals and objectives of the system. 
There are three hierarchical levels of a military command and control system: strategic, tactical 
and operational decisions. The strategic level operates with the longest time horizon and the operational 
level with the shortest. 
The highest levels of the decision process are the selection of the decision criteria and priorities 
that will govern the lower level decision processes. 
Decision process steps: 








Simplifications to be employed: 
Avoid the complexity of real optimization 
Avoid long term projection of outcomes 
Judgmental value criteria for intermediate outcomes 
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Reevaluate and revise planned courses of action 
Heuristic application of value concepts: 
Decompose complex decisions into simpler decision components that can be linked by 
Structure the considerations bearing on a decision so that they can be represented by 
Plan to adjust weights assigned to the value components so as to reflect current tactical 
Utilize value priorities that are communicated between decision makers to control and 
value considerations (tool: Lagrange multipliers) 
approximately additive components 
priorities 
coordinate distributed decision processes. 
To capture surprise the model must accurately portray the information available to each pilot and 
base simulated pilot decisions only on this information. 
When a pilot makes a decision along value-driven lines an alternative generator produces a 
candidate alternative, the mental model predicts what the situation will be if the alternative is 
implemented and an evaluation model places a numerical score on the resulting situation. When all 
promising alternative actions have been considered in this way, the highest scoring one is implemented. 
Projection times for the decision are relatively short. Each decision is reevaluated at various times and can 
be changed.” 
23 Janis, J. L. and L. Mann. Decision Making. The Free Press, New York NY, 1977. 
(1976) pp29-39: the decision maker satisfices rather than maximizes; that is, he looks for a course of 
action that is “good enough” and that meets a minimal set of requirements 
disturbance or disapproval because it will be seen as “acceptable by superiors and peers who will 
implement it and by subordinates who will implement it: Johnson, R. J. “Conflict avoidance though 
acceptable decisions,” Human Relations, 1974, vol. 27, pp7 1-82 
Hall, 1963 suggest the more uncertainty there is about a long-term outcome, the greater the tendency to 
make a policy decision on the basis of its short-term acceptability within the organization. 
The use of a satisficing strategy does not preclude contemplating a fairly large number of 
alternatives, but they are examined sequentially with no attempt to work out a comparative balance sheet 
of pros and cons. The alternatives are thought about until you find one that is OK 
“H. A. Simon. “Motivational and emotional controls of cognition,” Psvchological Review, vol. 74 
Executives gravitate to a more conventional “second best” choice that will cause little immediate 
Cyert, R. M. and J. G. March. A Behavioral Theorv of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Variables of a Satisficing Strategy 
I 
1. Number of requirements to be met (need only a few) 
2. Number of alternatives generated 
3. Decision maker (DM) typically tests alternatives only once and in a haphazard order 
4. Type of testing model used: usually above or below minimal cutoffs” 
(Elimination by aspects rule (A. Tversky “Elimination by aspects: a theory of choice” 
PsvcholoPical Review 1972 Vol. 79 pp281-99): 
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“Combination of simple decision rules to select rapidly from a number of salient 
alternatives one that meets a set of minimal requirements”) 
“People can not be expected to use the same strategy for all types of decisions 
Two strategies: vigilant when the decision is expensive to change; satisficing when 
decision is not expensive to change 
Symptoms of stress are often observed at the time of decision making. The intensity of the 
symptoms appears to depend upon the perceived magnitude of the losses the decision-maker 
anticipates from whatever choice he makes. 
Conflict-Theory Model: Assumptions 
1. Degree of stress is a function of the goal that the DM expects to remain unsatisfied. 
2. When DM is motivated to consider a new COA (course of action) the stress is a 
function of the degree to which he is committed to adhere to his present COA 
3. When each alternative poses a threat of serious risk the decision maker may use 
defensive avoidance of threat cues 
4. When the DM anticipates having insufficient time to find an adequate means of 
escaping serious losses, DM’s stress level remains high and the likelihood increases 
that his dominant pattern of response will be hypervigilance (in its extreme form 
panic). In hypervigilance the DM’s thought processes are disrupted 
5. A moderate degree of stress induces a vigilant effort. 
In hot cognitive situations (emergencies) or in all consequential decisions the prerequisites for a 
thought pattern of vigilance (good strategy) are: 
1. Awareness of serious threat 
2. Awareness of serious risks if most salient change to a new COA is taken 
3. Moderate or high degree of hope that a search for information and advice will lead to 
better solution 
4. Belief there is sufficient time to search and deliberate before any serious threat will 
materialize 
Prior training can foster each of the above conditions in emergency conditions. 
Consequential decisions include those that evoke some degree of concern or anxiety in the 
decision maker about the possibility he may not gain the objectives he is seeking or that he may 
become saddled with costs that are higher than he can afford. Uncertain risk also adds to anxiety. 
Stressful situation: encounters a challenge that represents a threat or an opportunity to attain an 
unfulfilled goal that requires changing to a new course of action whose outcome is uncertain. 
Pattern of defensive avoidance involves errors in assimilation of new information as well as 
failure to meet all the other requirements of vigilant decision making. 
Hypervigilance: impaired cognitive efficiency that characterizes frantic search and appraisal in an 
emotional state. 
The decision maker can bolster the least objectionable alternative by exaggerating the positive 
consequences or minimizing the negative consequences: 
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Defensive avoidance in the form of procrastination, buck passing and bolstering is a common 
occurrence when a difficult policy decision is to be made. When neither buck passing nor procrastination 
is possible, an iu-considered decision is bolstered by shared rationalizations. Wishful thinking is also part 
of defensive avoidance. 
Many historical fiascoes can be traced to defective policy making on the part of government 
leaders who receive social support from their in-group of advisors. Policy advisors can be dominated by 
concurrence seeking or groupthink and display symptoms of defensive avoidance. The policy maker 
receives social support from advisors who concur with his judgements and share in developing 
rationalizations that bolster the least objectionable choice. Ambiguous events that could suggest to a 
vigilant decision maker the urgent necessity to reconsider his current policy can readily be interpreted in a 
reassuring way when he or she is motivated to avoid awareness of the defects of the chosen course of 
actign. The decision maker entertains only those hypotheses that are consistent with his inclination to 
explain away any potentially ominous events; he fails to formulate or pursue alternative hypotheses that 
might represent a strong challenge to his decision. 









An illusion of invulnerability, shared by most or al l  members, which creates 
excessive optimism and encourages taking extreme risks; 
Collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount warnings which might lead the 
members to reconsider their assumptions before they recommit themselves to their 
past policy decisions 
An unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality 
Stereotyped views of rivals and enemies as too evil to warrant genuine attempts to 
negotiate, or as too weak or stupid to counter whatever risky attempts are made to 
defeat their purposes 
Direct pressure on any member who expresses strong arguments against any of the 
group’s stereotypes, illusions, or commitments, making clear that such dissent is 
contrary to what is expected of all loyal members. 
Self-censorship of deviations from the apparent group consensus, reflecting each 
member’s inclination n to minimize to himself the importance of his doubts and 
counter-arguments; 
A shared illusion of unanimity, partly resulting from this self-censorship and 
augmented by the false assumption that silence implies consent. 
The emergence of self-appointed “mind-guards”’-members who protect the group 
from adverse information that might shatter their shared complacency about the 
effectiveness and morality of their decisions. 
Conditions under which group think can arise: 
1. High cohesiveness 
2. Insulation of the group 
3. Lack of methodical procedures for search anb appraisal 
4. Directive leadership 
5. High stress with a low degree of hope for finding a better solution than the one 
favored by the leader or other influential persons 
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Major Kinds of consideration that enter into decisional conflicts: 
1. Utilitarian gains and losses for self 
2. Utilitarian gains and losses for significant others 
3. Self-approval or -disapproval; 
4. Approval or disapproval from significant others 
Five stage schema in arriving at a stable decision 
1. Appraising the challenge 
2. Surveying alternatives 
3. Weighing alternatives 
4. Deliberating about commitment 
5. Adhering despite negative feedback: will only change if encounters an effective 
challenge that is so powerful as to provoke dissatisfaction with his chosen course of 
action” 
Dupuy, COLT. N. Numbers, Predictions, and War, Revised Edition, Hero Books, Fairfax VA, 1985. 
“Book describes the Quantified Judgment Method of Analysis of Historical Combat Data 
(QJMA). A major component of the methodology is a long but simple mathematical equation, which is 
called the Quantified Judgement Model or QJM. 
It is difficult to analyze trends in ground combat from historical data. The author and his 
associates use data to form a coherent, consistent quantitative theory of combat. 
There is a chapter on the historical analysis of weapons lethality. (HERO is the Historical 
Evaluation and Research Organization.) Weapon lethality is “the inherent capability of a given weapon to 
kill personnel, or to make materiel ineffective in a given period of time, where capability includes the 
factors of weapon range, rate of fire, accuracy, radius of effects, and battlefield mobility” 
weather etc. Operational parameters are those which influence the employment of weapons and forces; 
e.g. posture, mobility. 
Intangible variables are those such as leadership training and morale. They can be assigned 
values on the basis of professional military experience; the values can be highly subjective. Intelligence 
is reflected to some extent in surprise; it is an aspect of leadership and is also related to training and 
experience. 
Leadership factor, training and/or experience factor and morale factor appear as part of the 
combat power potential 
One of the three principal problems encountered in evaluating the preliminary QJM analyses of 
WWII data was the perturbation in the data created by combat surprise. The authors incorporated the 
effects of surprise into their calculations. 
There are two major behavioral factors used: surprise and combat effectiveness. Combat 
effectiveness includes leadership, training/experience, morale, and logistics. Authors calculate a measure 
of combat effectiveness called casualty-inflicting capability for each side in historical battles; in WWII 
German vs. French, etc. 
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Environmental parameters are those which affect the effectiveness of weapons; e.g. terrain, 
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In those battles in which the record indicates that effective tactical surprise has been achieved, the 
effect of Surprise is captured by a judgmental decision to the category of surprise achieved Based on the 
category of surprise, values for factors modifying the comparative mobility characteristics and the 
vulnerability characteristics of the two sides are determined from a table. The effect of surprise over 
subsequent days of the battle is assumed to be of a specific form. 
Only when the record provides clear evidence that a degradation factor is appropriate for 
leadership, training and/or experience, morale, or logistical capability is a judgmental factor entered into 
the formulas. States of morale are expressed as categories. 
There are rules for exhaustion rates of combat units.” 
Halbert, G. A. “The impact of soft factors on intelligence analysis.” Presentation slides, Modernization 
NGIC rates factors such as leadership, training, readiness morale, cohesion and ability to execute 
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Trends Division, National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville VA, 1998. 
logistics for foreign ground forces; can a country assimilate new equipment and tactics. Rating scale 
from 1 to 10. Minimum of three people score the factors for each country. 
which combat effectiveness is lost. Mention of Dupuy’s view of effect of morale. Mention of Chinese 
work on integrating morale into Lanchester equations. 
Mention of Russian work (F.I. Markovskiy) on relation between morale and the level of losses at 
Cognitive skills degenerate when very thirsty or tired or in excessive heat 
26 Bradshaw, D. M. “Combat stress casualties: a commander’s influence,” Militaw Review, (July-August 
1995) pp. 20-22. 
“Combat stress causes battle casualties. A combat stress casualty is a soldier rendered combat 
ineffective due to the psychological strain of battle. Esprit is pride in a unit especially in a large unit 
where face-to face encounters are rare among some members. Cohesion is the feeling of belonging to a 
specific group, a solidarity marked by trust, loyalty, and mutual affection. Morale is the mental attitude 
of the individual characterized by confidence in self and in the primary group. 
A commander can directly decrease a unit’s combat stress casualties though his personal 
activities, proper treatment of casualties and leading by example. To be an effective leader, he must be 
healthy. In other words, the commander must practice physical and mental hygiene. This hygiene 
includes physical fitness, determining and using effective personal stress reduction techniques and sleep 
discipline. Being fit allows one to use less available physical energy per action and decreases recovery 
time, thereby reducing fatigue and physical stress. A knowledge of effective personal stress reduction 
techniques will decrease the mental stress experienced. 
Sleep discipline is especially important. During sleep deprivation, mental ability is impaired first 
and affects the information processing and decision making faculty to the greatest extent. A commander 
cannot afford to lose cognitive abilities when rapid decision making is required. 
Training under realistic conditions builds necessary soldier trust in themselves and the 
organization. Confidence is essential in reducing combat stress. Commanders influence cohesion by 
providing opportunities for common tasks and by increasing job stability within the unit.” 
Ingraham, L. H. and F. J. Manning. “Psychiatric battle casualties,” Militarv Review, (August 1980) pp. 
18-29. 
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Ingraham, L. H. and F. J. Manning. “Cohesion: who needs it, what is it and how do we get it,” Military 
Review, (June 1981) pp. 2-20. 
Noy, S .  “Combat psychiatry: the American and Israeli Experience.” In Contemuoraw Studies in Combat 
Psvchiatw, G. Belenky (Ed), Greenwood Press, New York, 1987, pp. 69-86. 
Haslam, A. P. “Sleep loss and military performance.” In Contemuoraw Studies in Combat Psychiatry, 
G. Belenky (Ed) Greenwood Press, New York, 1987, pp. 167-184. 
Fishburne, F.J. “Neuropsychological applications in military settings.” In Reuven Gal and A. David 21 
Mangelsdorff (Eds.) Handbook of Military Psychology, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1991. 
Belenky, G. L., G. P. Krueger, T. J. Balkin, D. B. Headley, andR. E. Solick “Effects of continuous 
operations (CONOPS) on soldier and unit performance: review of the literature and strategies for 
sustaining the soldier in CONOPS,” (WRAIR Report No. BB-87-1) Walter Reed Army Institute of 
Research, Washington DC, 1987. 
endurance are less impaired by limited or no sleep than are cognitive abilities. If soldiers get regular 
sleep of six to eight hours per 24 period, cognitive performance is unaffected If soldiers get only 3 to 4 
hours sleep per day, effective cognitive performance can only be maintained for five or six days. With 
less than 3 hours sleep per day there is a rapid decline in cognitive ability within 72 hours from the time 
the mission begins.” 
“Literature review pertaining to sleep deprivation which shows that physical strength and 
~ ~ 
Van Fleet, D. D. and G. A. Yukl. Militarv LeadershiD: An Organizational Behavior Perspective. JAI 
“Business and industrial organizations tend to be heavily utilitarian (members perform for 
Military organizations are normative (members perform out of duty) and to a lessor extent 
Press Inc. London, England 1986. 
money) in terms of the modes of compliance obtained within them. 
coercive (members perform out of fear). Normative organizations stress values more than utilitarian 
organizations would. 
A study of traits and skills of leaders in military organizations found the following 
Ethical conduct, personal integrity 
Leadership effectiveness and achievement 
Williigness to assume responsibility 
Courage, daring 
Maintaining coordination and team work 
Ascendance, dominance and team work 
Emotional balance and control 
Intellectual skills 
Social and interpersonal skills 
Technical skius 
Group task supportiveness 
Effective mangers and administrators in large hierarchical organizations tend to have a strong 
need for power, a moderately strong need for achievement, and a somewhat weaker need for affiliation. 
Effective leaders tend to have high self-esteem, energy, maturity, stress tolerance, and a favorable attitude 
toward authority figures. They are inclined to be pragmatic and results-oriented, rather than introspective, 
philosophical or idealistic. 
organization through power tempered by emotional maturity and inhibition. The dominant leader 
characteristics that have been shown to be important are managerial motivation and task relevant 
expertise. 
The most effective forms of leader’s personal power appear to be the leader’s expertise based on 
demonstrated competence, the leader attractiveness based on personal qualities, and loyalty to the leader 
developed through a history of satisfactory exchange relationships wherein the leader provided benefits to 
subordinates and treated them in a fair and considerate manner. 
of plans and idleness increases the danger from fear. The most important factors in controlling fear are: 
devotion to cause, leadership, training and materiel. 
activities, and take decisive action in dealing with immediate crises. Planning and problem solving are 
important for leadership effectiveness in combat situations. Interpersonal relations a e  less important both 
to leaders and to subordinates in crisis situations. In such situations the only aspect of consideration that 
remains important to subordinates is the extent to which the leader is really concerned about their welfare 
and survival.” 
There are autobiographies and biographies of military leaders who achieved some degree of fame 
and recognition for their successful leadership. 
“Behavior categories that are important in leaders are inspiration, performance emphasis, 
clarifying work roles, planning and problem solving.” 
Effective leaders are more likely to develop subordinate loyalty and dedication to the 
A study of World War I veterans suggested that the presence of hunger, thirst, fatigue, ignorance 
Leaders in combat situations must plan for enemy actions, effectively organize and schedule unit 
29 Heslegrave, R. J. and C. Colvin. “An exploration of psychological and psychophysical measures as 
predictors of successful performance under stress.” Technical Report 1035, United States Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, January 1996. 
“In an earlier report the authors concluded that stress was best characterized as the dynamic 
relationship between situational demands, the cognitive appraisal of those demands, and an individual’s 
response to these demands. Effective coping occurs when there is a balance between environmental 
demands and the individual’s perceived available resources. Based on the literature, a personality profile 
emerged that successful copers tended to be more introverted, task-oriented, and self confident. It was 
concluded that cardiovascular measures such as heart rate and vagal tone were potentially sensitive 
discriminators and predictors of successful performance in stressful occupations. 
ability to change the situations as high and that those individuals who perceived their abilities to change 
stressful situations engaged in more problem-focused coping strategies as planning, suppressing 
competing activities, restraint coping, and reinterpretation and growth. 
In a second investigation, individuals with better performance under stress showed higher heart 
rates and blood pressures under stress as well as lower vagal tone and greater suppression of vagal tone 
from baseline levels. Personality predictor variables were less consistent. The data suggest that those 
In one study it was found that individuals who rated situations as less stressful tended to rate their 
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individuals who perceive themselves as having more ability to cope with stress and those individuals who 
more actively cope with stressful situations are more successful performers when they encounter the need 
to perform under stress.” 
References: 
Appley, M. H. and Trumbull, R. (1986) “Development of the stress concept” In M. H. Appley and 
R. Trumbull (Eds.) Dynamics of stress: phvsiolonical, psvcholonical, and social perspectives. New York: 
Plenum, pp. 2-18. 
Baumeister, R. F. (1984) “Choking under pressure: self-consciousness and paradoxical effects of 
incentives on skilled performance” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 46 610-620. 
Beutler, L. E. (1985). “Parameters in the prediction of police officer performance” Professional 
Psvchology: Research and Practice vol. 16 pp324-335. 
Rachman, S. J. (1991) Psychological analyses of courageous performance in military personnel 
(ARI Research Note 91-86). Alexandria, VA: U. S .  Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences. (AD A241 226) 
Payne, J. W., J. R. Bettman, and E. J. Johnson. “Behavioral decision research: a constructive processing 30 
perspective,” Annual Review of Psvcholonv, 43 (1992) pp. 87-131. 
economics, social and cognitive psychology, statistics, and other fields. This chapter reviews behavioral 
decision research for the period 1983-1991 with a focus on the constructive nature of judgment and 
choice. A theme of decision research is that preferences for and beliefs about objects or events of any 
complexity are often constructed-not merely revealed-in the generation of a response to a judgment or 
choice task. 
decision. Framing is influenced by how the decision problem is presented and by the norms, habits, and 
expectations of the decision maker. A complete theory of framing has proven difficult to formalize. 
The apparent completeness of a display can blind a decision-maker to the possibility that 
important information is missing from a problem description. 
A hypothesis is that the more complex a decision problem, the more people will use simplifying 
decision heuristics. Gaeth and Shanteau (1984) found that judgments were adversely influenced by 
irrelevant factors, although that influence could be reduced with training. People respond in several ways 
when faced with decision problems varying in time pressure. These coping mechanisms include the 
acceleration of processing, selectivity in processing, and shifts in decision strategies. Under time stress, 
processing is focused on the more important and/or more negative information about alternatives. Under 
more severe time pressure, people accelerated processing, focussed on a subset of information, and 
changed processing strategies. 
described above for preferences among multi-attribute alternatives and for the assessment of 
uncertainties. 
people have available or can generate a repertoire of strategies or heuristics for solving decision problems. 
It is also assumed that the strategies have differing advantages (benefits) and disadvantages (costs). The 
emphasis of Beach’s image theory (Beach 1990) is on noncompensatory tests of the acceptability or 
“Behavioral decision research (BDR) is interdisciplinary, employing concepts and models from 
Framing involves the determination of the effective acts, contingencies, and outcomes of a 
Decisions under risk are seen as being sensitive to the same types of context and task variables 
The most frequently used approach to explaining contingent decision behavior assumes that 
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compatibility of a single alternative (candidate option) with the decision-maker’s values of goals 
(images). 
decision-maker can be seen as falling on a continuum from intuition (characterized by rapid data 
processing, low cognitive control, and low awareness of processing) to analysis (characterized by slow 
data processing, high cognitive control, and high awareness of processing). 
therefore may be more data driven is provided by Keinan (1987) 
incentives do is prolong deliberation or attention to a problem; people generally work harder on more 
important problems. More effort is generally believed to lead to better performance. However, as 
reported in Paese and Sniezek (1991), increased effort may lead to increased confidence in judgment 
without accompanying increases in accuracy. 
The process of combining information in the head is often called clinical judgment. 
Decision processes are not invariant across task environments complicates the search for a small 
set of underlying principles (models) that can describe behavior. Hogarth and Einhorn (1991) noted that 
the importance and pervasiveness of task and context effects may create a view of decision research as a 
Hammond et al. 1987 argue that the cognitive processes (modes of thought) available to a 
There is evidence that people scan alternatives in a more nonsystematic fashion under stress, and 
As noted by Tversky and Kahneman (1986) incentives do not work by magic. Generally what 
fragmented and chaotic field. <ir 
Well established are the effects of task complexity on decision strategy use, the importance of 
gain vs. loss distinction in both risky and:riskless preference, and the prevalence of the anchoring and 
adjustment process in judgment.” 
References: 
decision makers<” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 33 (1984) pp. 263-282. 
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Keinan, G. “Decision making under stress: scanning of alternatives under controllable and 
Paese, P. W. and J. A. Sniezek. “Influences on the appropriateness of confidence in judgment: 
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31 Janis, I. L. Crucial Decisions. The Free Press, New York, NY, 1989. 
“A main goal of book is to address the following questions: When and why do leaders of large 
organizations make avoidable errors that result in faulty policy decisions? How can such errors be 
prevented or at least kept to a minimum. 
The steps of vigilant problem solving to make decisions: 
Formulate the problem: what are the requirements; direction of solution? 
Use informational resources: prior information and new information 
Analyse and reformulate the problem: additions or changes to requirements? Additional 
Evaluate and select an alternative 
Decide after adequate search, appraisal, and planning 
Bolster the decision by playing up the advantages and playing down the disadvantages; solicit 
alternatives? Additional information needed? 
supportive information; announce decision to interested parties; promote the decision. 
Assumptions 
determinants of a successful outcome. 
r i The quality of the procedures use to arrive at a fundamental policy decision is one of the major 
Most leaders are capable of carrying out procedures needed for high quality decision making. 
Policy makers make no effort to use high quality procedures to make decisions they regard as 
In important policy decisions a few constraints will dominate the thinking. 
’. 
unimportant. 
Factors influencing policymakers judgments on the importance of a potential problem 
It is important if there is a large discrepancy between the existing and desired state of affairs. 
It is important if the new problem is viewed as linked to a problem already being worked on. 
The total number of important problems already being worked on. 
General tendency to ignore threats that develop gradually rather than precipitately. 
An unambiguous threat that arises without any prior warning requires more than standard 
operating procedures and decision rules. 
How serious a decision maker becomes about an emerging threat depends on how familiar the 
policymaker is with the type of danger to which a valid warning refers. 
When managers believe that the complexities of the issues exceed their capabilities or the 
organization lacks adequate resources for working out a high-quality solution to a problem they judge to 
be very important, they will make a crucial policy decision by “the seat-of-their-pants” without bothering 
to examine carefully the pertinent information that is readily available. 
Cognitive Decision rule: 
minimal requirements without bothering to compare it with other viable alternatives. 
Role of personality in leadership: 
Satisficing: Accept the first alternative that comes to mind that is “good enough” to meet the 
. . . .. 
At present the role of personality in leadership is in the doldrums because few generalizations 
about the interaction of personality and situational factors have as yet emerged. 
Five potential factors to describe major features of personality 
versus lax. 
variety versus preference for routine. 
Conscientiousness-well organized versus disorganized; careful versus careless; self-disciplined 
Openness-imaginative versus down to earth; independent versus conforming; preference for 
Neuroticism-worrying versus calm; insecure versus secure; self-pitying versus self-satisfied. 
Agreeableness-considerate versus ruthless; trusting versus suspicious; helpful versus 
Extraversion-sociable versus retiring; active versus passive. 
uncooperative. 
Hypotheses concerning factors associated with poor decision making: 
Minimize importance of major challenging threats: 
Chronic lack of conscientiousness 
Chronic lack of openness?iack of imagination, failure to think and act independently and 
Calm, cool detached coping style in response to fear-arousing events or communications; 
Chronic optimism concerning the organization’s stability and vulnerability 
4 
preference for routine 
high stress tolerance tends to make people relatively unresponsive to serious warnings 
Overreaction to information: 
Low self confidence, including chronic sense of low self-efficacy. 
Chronic pessimism Concerning organization’s ability to supply the resources essential for 
solving complicated policy problems, with supporting beliefs about internal weaknesses that preclude 
adaptive changes. 
Overreaction to social pressures: 
Chronically strong need for social approval 
Strong need for power and status 
Chronic apprehensiveness about ruthlessness of other powerholders in the organization 
with supporting beliefs about their readiness to inflict retaliations 
High dependency upon a cohesive group of fellow executives for social support 
Egocentric constraints by arousing strong personal motives: 
Chronic lack of conscientiousness 
Persistent negativism or hostility toward the organization with supporting beliefs about 
undesirable features that make it undeserving of loyalty. 
Overreaction to information by arousing anxiety or other emotional reactions: 
Low stress tolerance-manifested by relatively high level of anxiety with feelings of 
helplessness and vulnerability 
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Lack of perceived control over outcomes and other components of a low level of 
Persistent ambivalence toward the organization such that it is seen as having positive 
personality hardiness 
features that make it deserving of loyalty but is also seen as having negative features that make it weak 
and vulnerable 
Habitual externalized anger-coping style 
Persistent hostility toward major opponents, with supporting beliefs about their evil and 
hostile intentions.” 
Decision Science Applications. “Digital simulation of pilot performance: a feasibility study for a model 32 
to address workload issues in the night, all-weather, low-level ground attack mission.” DSA Report, No. 
469 Decision-Science Applications, Arlington VA 22209, 1982. 
and limitations to assist in workload evaluation and other problems relating to the night, low-level ground 
attack (NILLGA) mission. Human Factors emphasis on evaluating changes to cockpit. 
r 
“Proposal for the development of a computer simulation of pilot workload capabilities 
TAC BRAWLER simulates pilots and has pilot tasking decision algorithms. ‘ .  
Time compression phenomenon: occurs when there is the requirement to perform many 
The self tasking algorithm chooses the set of compatible tasks that maximizes a value 
Y ‘I 
tasks together. 
function based on short-term considerations. Each task has a value associated with its performance and 
each time a self-tasking decision is made the model tries to pick a set of feasible tasks for which the sum 
of the individual task values is (approximately) maximized The value function is heuristically motivated 
by viewing each task that a pilot might perform as an activity that reduces the probability per unit time 
that something undesirable happens. Since different tasks take different time units use return per unit 
time; more generally, the ratio of the remaining benefit to the remaining time needed. Mental resources 
of a pilot consist of a single consciousness unit and several peripheral processors (which process in the 
background). The task is done more efficiently by the consciousness unit. The algorithm schedules tasks. 
central status. There is a mental model. Information amves to the mental model via sensor events. 
Incoming information is processed by the pilot’s mental model and is then deposited in his mental status 
array. There are tasks that have an information-gathering intent. 
path selection, target selection and ordnance release; how to use a piece of equipment (radar selection 
mode); reattack an area.” 
decision making. 
Greenstein, J. S .  and W. B. Rouse. “A model of human decisionmaking in multiple process monitoring 
situations,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Vol. SMC-12, No. 2, Mar/Apr 82. 
Each simulated decision-maker has a personal mental status array, which mirrors the 
Tactical decisions are any decisions that are not self-tasking decisions; for example: flight 
TAC BRAWLER decision making appears to be very complex form of engineering 
33 Reisweber, D. “Battle command: will we have it when we need it,” Military Review, (Sept-Oct 1997) 
pp. 49-52 and 56-58. 
“The US Army has embraced battle command, a concept which involves expertise in 
understanding the current state of the battlefield, visualizing a desired future end state, communicating 
intent and making the desired end state a reality. In simpler terms, it is the ability to create a vision for 
success (to know) and see it applied on the battlefield (to do). To know encompasses the visualization 
tasks involved in battle command. A battle command master is able to see both friendly and enemy 
forces in time and space and the results of their contacts, ‘ To do is the skill in taking this vision, 
successfully communicating it to subordinates, constructing a plan that will achieve success and providing 
leadership which can carry the operation to a successful end state. 
There is ample evidence to suggest that battle command skills are a function of not only raw 
talent, but years of practice, experience and maturation. The Army has already begun identifying the 
battle command skills and traits that are involved in thought and action processes. These initial insights 
support the concept that howledge is fundamental. There is no substitute for technical domain 
knowledge in proficient battle command. Recent studies also suggest that similar trait clusters are 
associated with successful battle commanders. These traits include cognitive complexity and behavioral 
complexity among others. 
formation, problem solving and decision making. Cognitive complexity involves a broad range of skills 
that include integration of information, ahraction, independent thought and use of broad and complex 
frames of reference. Those with high lev& of cognitive complexity are able to think in metaphors and 
seek related patterns in unrelated objects, situations and events. Cognitive complexity is a measure of 
how an individual constructs meaning and organization to incoming information. 
Those most gifted in cognitive complexity skills are better able to understand and identify what is 
critical or key given the same amount of information available to others. 
An officer Personnel Management System study conducted by the Department of History at the 
United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, found that successful leaders are able to assess 
rapidly changing situations and continually assimilate large quantities of conflicting information. 
is based on reasoning in which premises are often implicit, problems are not well bounded, several 
possible answers to a problem may exist and uncertainty is always present. 
skill involves the ability to know or find the essence of a situation. 
biases that often blind one’s decision making. These biases include placing greater importance on initial 
information than on later-amving information and ignoring information that conflicts with one’s initial 
assessment. Other assessment skills that will help develop battle commander skills include mental 
simulation, visualization, prediction, and anticipation. 
not lie solely in the information the commander receives, but how his knowledge base, experience and 
cognitive skills shape and interpret the information received. 
without finely tuned interpersonal and technical skills. Behavioral complexity involves the ability to 
execute a complex strategy by playing multiple, even competing roles in a highly integrated and 
Cognitive processes consist of many types of mental processes such as learning, memory, concefl 
A technique that appears to better develop battle command thinking skills is practical thinking. It 
Another cognitive approach in developing battle command skills is situation assessment. This 
Key to successful battlefield assessment is recognizing and taking into account classic human 
Information technology cannot guarantee success on future battlefields. The key to success will 
Those with the most sophisticated thinking processes will not be able to implement their Vision 
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complementary way. These roles include those of mentor, facilitator, innovator, producer, and director. 
Individuals high in behavioral complexity are able to motivate their subordinates to make their vision 
happen. They are high in self efficacy, a belief that they have control and a direct impact on their 
environment by what they do. Their behavioral skills allow them to use the social influence process to 
guide members in organizations to achieve the commanders’ goals.” 
Reference: 
S .  M. Halpin “The human dimensions of battle command: a behavioral science perspective on the art of 
battle command” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Research Institute (ARI) Battle Command Task Force 
Report. 1995) 
Cohen, M. S .  and J. T. Freeman. “Metarecognition in time-stressed decision making: recognizing, 34 
critiquing, and correcting,” Human Factors, 38 (1996) pp. 206-219. 
“Describes a framework for decision making, called the recognitionlmetacognition @/M) model 
to explain how decision makers handle uncertainty and novelty while exploiting their experience in real- 
world domains. The study used a military scenario. The decision was whether or not to engage an 
incoming gunboat. The study was empirical. A conclusion is that the decision makers developed a set of 
situation models together with an understanding of their strength and weaknesses. Metacognition are 
processes that monitor and regulate other thought processes such as memory, attention, and 
comprehension. The authors discuss evihence for a set of specific metacognitive skills in proficient 
decision making. These skill include going beyond pattern matching in order to create plausible stories 
for novel situations; noticing conflicts between observations and a conclusion; elaborating on a story to 
explain a conflicting cue rather than simply disregarding or discounting the cue; having sensitivity to 
problems in explaining away too much conflicting data; attempting to generate alternative coherent 
stories to account for data; and having a refined ability to estimate the time available for decision making. 
Expert physicians spent more time verifymg their diagnoses than did less experienced physicians. 
More experienced decision makers buy themselves more time for resolving uncertainty by 
a) explicitly asking how much time they have before they must commit to a decision and b) estimating the 
available time more precisely. Less experienced decision makers are more likely to consider an 
alternative hypothesis at the start of their thinking and then to prematurely reject it in the face of any 
conflict. More experienced decision makers adopt more sophisticated critiquing strategies. They start by 
focusing on what is wrong with the current model especially incompleteness. Experienced decision 
makers adopt more sophisticated correcting strategies. They try to mod@ a story in order to explain 
conflicting evidence rather than ignore or discount the story. They evaluate the assumptions required by 
alternative stories rather than compare the data with futed pattems or checklists. They try to construct a 
more plausible story by revising the most unreliable assumptions in the current stories. The FVM model 
needs to be tested and refined in research that spans several domains and that involves a variety of 
converging methods.” 
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35 Cohen, M. S . ,  J. T. Freeman, J.J. Fallesen, F.F. Marvin, and T. A. Bresnick ’Training critical thinking 
skills for battlefield situation assessment: an experimental test,” Technical Report 1050, United States 
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, October 1996. 
earlier research This framework is referred to as the recognitionlmetarecognition 
Battlefield situation assessment is a key component to tactical decision making.” 
“A cognitive framework for battlefield situation assessment was developed and documented in 
model. 
Reference: 
Cohen, M. S., L. Adelman, M. A. Tolcott, T. A. Bresnick, and F. F. Marvin. “A cognitive 
framework for battlefield commander’s situation assessment” (ARI Technical report 1002), US Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria VA, 1994. 
Using this model, midgrade Army officers were examined while they conducted battlefield 
planning. An interesting tendency was identified: proficient decision makers appear to construct complete 
and coherent situation models by collecting or retrieving information and resolving any apparent 
conflicts. 
improve officer’s critiquing and correcting skills. 
and go beyond the recognitional processes in situation assessment. Situation assessment begins as 
recognition but continues if there is cause and opportunity to do so with one or more cycles of critical 
thinking. In a process called critiquing, the decision maker looks for sources of uncertainty, such as: 
1) incomplete information; 2) unreliable assumptions; or 3) data that support conflicting conclusions. 
When problems are found, they are the targets of a correctional process, in which the decision maker 
collects more information, retrieves more,infonnation from long-term memory, or adjusts assumptions 
that stand in for missing information. The decision maker’s newly elaborated understanding of the 
problem is re-evaluated as situation assessment continues in further cycles of recognition and 
metacognition. A process called the Quick Test regulates critiquing and correcting. They continue only as 
long as time is available, the cost of an ei-ror is high, and the situation remains unfamiliar or problematic. 
Critiquing can result in the discovery of three kinds of problems with an assessment: 
incompleteness, unreliability, or conflict. An assessment is incomplete if key elements of a situation 
model or plan based on the assessment are missing. In identifying incompleteness, the recognitional 
meanings of the cues are embedded within a structure of some kind In particular, story structures depict 
causal and intentional relations among events and have characteristics sets of components.” 
This report assesses the merit of training methods based on the model. The training is intended to 
The following is a summary of the R/M model. Meta-recognition is a cluster of skills that support 
Reference: 
Pennington, N. and R. Hastie. “A theory of explanation-based decision making.” In G. A. Klein, 
J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, and C. E. Zsambok (Eds.), Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods, 
Ablex, Norwood NJ, 1993. 
“In particular, the main components of stories concerned with assessments of enemy intent are goals, 
capabilities and opportunities (which elicit) the intent to attack at a particular place and h e  (which leads 
to) actions (which result in) consequences. Understanding and planning are unreliable if the argument 
from evidence to conclusion, or from goals to action, is conditioned on doubtful assumptions. 
reliability of assumptions. They try to construct complete and coherent situation models. They do this if 
possible by means of newly collected or retrieved information, but if necessary by adopting assumptions. 
Success in filling gaps and resolving conflict does not mean that decision makers accept the resulting 
situation model. However, it does tell them what they must believe if they were to accept it. This process 
facilitates evaluation of a model by reducing all considerations to a single common currency: the 
reliability of its assumptions. Ifunreliability is too great, a new cycle of critiquing will hopefully expose 
it and trigger efforts to construct a new story. 
These skills include identifying key assessments and the recognitional support for them, checking stories 
Proficient decision makers first try to fill gaps and explain conflict, and only then assess the 
The R/M model describes a set of skills that supplement pattern recognition in novel situations. 
55 
and plans based on those assessments for completeness, noticing conflicts among the recognitional 
meanings of cues, elaborating stones to explain a conflicting cue rather than simply disregarding it, 
sensitivity to problems of unreliability in explaining away too much conflicting data, attempting to 
generate alternative coherent stones to account for data, and a sensitivity to available time, stakes, and 
novelty that regulates the use of these techniques.” 
Rabbitt, P. M.A. and E. A. Maylor. “ Investigating models of human performance,” British Journal of 36 
PSYCholO~~, 82 (199 1) pp. 25 9-290. 
“Reviews studies of ways in which performance in choice reaction time, visual search, and simple 
memory tasks is affected by individual differences in age and intelligence, by alcohol and by practice. 
The results are discussed in terms of the successes and limitations of 5 types of models: ‘box-and-arrow 
in formation flow models; ‘control-process’ models; algebraic models of decision latencies; ‘single- 
factor’ models derived from psychometrics; and connectionist-network models.” 
“Broadbent (1971) attempts to set out a complete methodology for studying the effects of stress 
and individual differences on human performance.” 
Broadbent, D. E. (1971) Decision and Stress. London: Academic Press. 
“The review of the current paper considers Broadbent’s‘exploration of how detailed functional ?! 
models of performance of particular tasks can be broadened to help us understand the functional aetiology 
of brief fluctuations in efficiency, of steady improvement with practice and of stable individual 
differences of performance practice. The authors consider how easy serial choice reaction time (CRT) 
tasks and simple laboratory memory tasks are effected by individual differences in old age, by differences 
in individual IQ scores (IQTSs), by a particular drug, alcohol, and by a state variable, degree of practice.” 
37 Foss, J. W. “Command,” Militarv Review, (Jan-Feb 1997) pp. 66-70. 
commanders anticipate. Not only do they anticipate the enemy, they anticipate their subordinates’ needs 
and provide help and support to facilitate overall mission accomplishment. In this regard, the staff plays a 
key role. They must be forward-looking, helping the commander anticipate. Successful commanders 
also have a vision of the task. They “see” the task in its proper perspective; they understand the 
conditions necessary for success. Further, they articulate those points to others. The commander who 
centralizes everything in an attempt to be strong everywhere is, in fact, strong nowhere. His chain of 
command and his junior leaders will never develop responsibility and initiative. Commanders must be 
provided the maximum freedom to command and have imposed on them only those control measures 
necessary to synchronize mission accomplishment.” 
“The future battlefield will be less forgiving of slow decisions than ever before. Good 
Hunt, J. G. and R. L. Phillips. “Leadership in battle and military performance.” In Handbook of 38 
Militarv Psychology, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1991. 
Quinn, R. Beyond Rational Management: Mastering the Paradoxes and Comoeting Demands of 
High Performance, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1988. 
Quinn, R. “Applying the competing values approach to leadership: toward an integrative 
framework.” In J. G. Hunt, D. M. Hoskings, C. A. Schriesheim, and R. Stewart (Eds.) Leaders and 
Managers: International Persuectives on Managerial Behavior and Leadership, Pergamon, Elmford NY, 
1984. 
“Training can modify behavior: skill development techniques under high stress situations involve 
overlearning through extended practice to produce automatic responses and overlearning for 
improvisation” (Weick, K. E. “A stress analysis of future battlefields.” In J. G. Hunt and J. D. Blair 
(Eds.), Leadership on the Future Battlefield, pp. 32-46, Pergamon Press-Brassey’s, Washington DC, 
1985). 
Van Fleet, D. D. and G. A. Yukl. Militarv Leadership: An Organizational Behavior Perspective. JAI 
“Business and industrial organizations tend to be heavily utilitarian (members perform for 
Military organizations are normative (members perform out of duty) and to a lessor extent 
39 
Press Inc. London, England 1986. 
money) in terms of the modes of compliance obtained within them. 
coercive (members perform out of fear). Normative organizations stress values more than utilitarian 
organizations would. 
A study of traits and skills of leaders in military organizations found the following 
Ethical conduct, personal integrity 
Leadership effectiveness and achievement 
Willingness to assume r*ponsibility 
Courage, daring 
Maintaining coordination and team work 
Ascendance, dominance and team work 
Emotional balance and control 
Intellectual skills 
Social and interpersonal skills 
Technical skills 
Group task supportiveness 
1 -  
Effective mangers and administrators in large hierarchical organizations tend to have a strong 
need for power, a moderately strong need for achievement, and a somewhat weaker need for affiliation. 
Effective leaders tend to have high self-esteem, energy, maturity, stress tolerance, and a favorable attitude 
toward authority figures. They are inclined to be pragmatic and results-oriented, rather than introspective, 
philosophical or idealistic 
Effective leaders are more likely to develop subordinate loyalty and dedication to the 
organization through power tempered by emotional maturity and inhibition. The dominant leader 
characteristics, which have been shown to be important, are managerial motivation and task relevant 
expertise. 
The most effective forms of leader’s personal power appear to be the leader’s expertise based on 
demonstrated competence, the leader attractiveness based on personal qualities, and loyalty to the leader 
developed through a history of satisfactory exchange relationships wherein the leader provided benefits to 
subordinates and treated them in a fair and considerate manner. 
57 
A study of World War 1 veterans suggested that the presence of hunger, thirst, fatigue, ignorance 
of plans and idleness increases the danger from fear. The most important factors in controlling fear are: 
devotion to cause, leadership, training and materiel. 
activities, and take decisive action in dealing with immediate crises. Planning and problem solving are 
important for leadership effectiveness in combat situations. Interpersonal relations are less important both 
to leaders and to subordinates in crisis situations. In such situations the only aspect of consideration that 
remains important to subordinates is the extent to which the leader is really concerned about their welfare 
and survival.” 
There are autobiographies and biographies of military leaders who achieved some degree of fame 
and recognition for their successful leadership. 
“Behavior categories that are important in leaders are inspiration, performance emphasis, 
clarifying work roles, planning and problem solving.” 
Leaders in combat situations must plan for enemy actions, effectively organize and schedule unit 
~ ~ ~~ 
ARI Newsletter. “Transformational leadership and follower development,” ARI Newsletter (Fall 1996) 40 
p. 12. 
f 
“Transactional leadership involves exchanges between leaders and followers that reflect more 
traditional forms of “management by objectives.” In transactional exchanges, leaders specify 
requirements and the conditions and rewards for fulfilling those requirements. Transformational 
leadership achieves levels of effects over and above those produced by transactional exchanges. These 
augmenting effects are achieved through the following types of transformational behaviors: behaving so 
as to become a role model which followers want to emulate; providing meaning and challenge so as to 
inspire commitment to goals beyond self interest and to a shared vision; encouraging new ways of 
thinking, new approaches to problems, and learning from mistakes; and paying attention to each 
individual’s particular needs, desires and capabilities. Bernard M. Bass and his fellow researchers have 
developed questionnaire measures of transformational and transactional leadership behavior. 
The Center for Leadership and Organizations Research (CLOR), jointly operated at West Point 
by the United States Military Academy and the Army research Institute is administering the measures of 
transformational and transactional leadership for inclusion in the Baseline Officer Longitudinal Data Set 
(BOLDS)” 
Okechuku, C. “The relationship of six managerial characteristics to the assessment of managerial 
effectiveness in Canada, Hong Kong and People’s Republic of China,” Journal of OccuDational and 
Organizational Psychology, 67 (1994) pp. 79-86. 
“The purpose of this study is to provide a descriptive comparison of the relative influence of 
certain Westem-conceptualized managerial abilities, traits and motivations in assessing managerial 
effectiveness in the PRC and Hong Kong relative to a Western society such as Canada. Six 
characteristics considered to be critical to managerial success are supervisory ability, achievement 
motivation, intellectual ability, self-actualization, self-assurance, and decisiveness. In the West people 
tend to see themselves as individuals while in Chinese culture people tend to see themselves as part of a 
collective.” 
41 
Smith, P. B., J. Misumi, M. Tayeb, M. Peterson, and M. Bond. “On the generality of leadership style 42 
measures across cultures,” Journal of Occupational Psychology, 62 (1989) pp. 97-109. 
58 
“Study using shop-floor work teams and their immediate supervisors in Britain, the United States, 
Hong Kong and Japan. Where individualistic values prevail a leader’s options may be expected to 
include the option of exerting direct pressure towards a goal. Where collectivist values prevail, leadership 
is more likely to emphasize reciprocal influence processes.” 
Van Fleet, D. D. and G. A. Yukl. Military Leadershiu: An Organizational Behavior Perspective. JAI 
“Business and industrial organizations tend to be heavily utilitarian (members perform for 
Military organizations are normative (members perform out of duty) and to a lessor extent 
43 
Press Inc. London, England 1986. 
money) in terms of the modes of compliance obtained within them. 
coercive (members perform out of fear). Normative organizations stress values more than utilitarian 
organizations would. 
A study of traits and skills of leaders in military organizations found the following 
Ethical conduct, personal integrity 
Leadership effectivenesspd achievement 
Willingness to assume responsibility 
Courage, daring 
Maintaining coordination‘and team work 
Ascendance, dominance and team work 
Emotional balance and control 
Intellectual skills 
Social and interpersonal skills 
Technical skills 
Group task supportiveness 
Effective mangers and administrators in large hierarchical organizations tend to have a strong 
need for power, a moderately strong need for achievement, and a somewhat weaker need for affiliation. 
Effective leaders tend to have high self-esteem, energy, maturity, stress tolerance, and a favorable attitude 
toward authority figures. They are inclined to be pragmatic and results-oriented, rather than introspective, 
philosophical or idealistic 
organization through power tempered by emotional maturity and inhibition. The dominant leader 
characteristics that have been shown to be important are managerial motivation and task relevant 
expertise. 
The most effective forms of leader’s personal power appear to be the leader’s expertise based on 
demonstrated competence, the leader attractiveness based on personal qualities, and loyalty to the leader 
developed through a history of satisfactory exchange relationships wherein the leader provided benefits to 
subordinates and treated them in a fair and considerate manner. 
of plans and idleness increases the danger from fear. The most important factors in controlling fear are: 
devotion to cause, leadership, training and materiel. 
Effective leaders are more likely to develop subordinate loyalty and dedication to the 
A study of World War I veterans suggested that the presence of hunger, thirst, fatigue, ignorance 
I 59 
Leaders in combat situations must plan for enemy actions, effectively organize and schedule unit 
activities, and take decisive action in dealing with immediate crises. Planning and problem solving are 
important for leadership effectiveness in combat situations. Interpersonal relations are less important both 
to leaders and to subordinates in crisis situations. In such situations the only aspect of consideration that 
remains important to subordinates is the extent to which the leader is really concerned about their welfare 
and survival.” 
There are autobiographies and biographies of military leaders who achieved some degree of fame 
and recognition for their successful leadership. 
“Behavior categories that are important in leaders are inspiration, performance emphasis, 
clarifying work roles, planning and problem solving.” 
Yukl, G. A. and D. D. Van Fleet. “Cross-situational, multimethod research on military leader 44 
effectiveness,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 30 (1982) pp. 87-108. 
“Aspects of leadership found effective: performance emphasis; inspiration; role clarification; 
provide clear directions; criticism-discipline; planning and problem solving was important in combat 
situations. Friendly interpersonal relations become less important both to leaders and to subordinates in 
crisis situations.” f 
Johnson, J. E. V. and A. C. Bruce. “Risk strategy under task complexity: a multivariate analysis of 45 
behaviour in a naturalistic setting,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making;, 11 (1998) pp. 1-17. 
“Study analyzes a large sample of decisions made by individuals in UK offcourse betting 
markets. The investigation focuses on the comparative impacts of complexity defined in terms 
respectively of alternatives and attributes. The results suggest that the risk strategy employed is affected 
by task complexity. Complexity does not affect the size of risk accepted but alternative- and attribute- 
based complexity together influence the propensity to accept greater degrees of risk. In addition, the 
effect of attribute-based complexity on risk taking appears to be modified by the use of risk-hedging 
strategies. 
number of alternatives between which an individual must discriminate in making a decision. Since . 
information load, the amount one needs to know in order to make effective decisions, and hence 
complexity, are expected to increase with the number of alternatives, this is referred to as altemative- 
based complexity. The concept of discriminability is the ease with which alternatives can be 
distinguished by their attributes. This may be affected by complicated relationships between attributes 
that confound analysis of a set of alternatives. (Klein and Yadov 1989) In addition, lack of knowledge on 
the part of the decision maker or the nature of the problem may result in perceived ambiguity in the value 
of attributes or a lesser degree of relative attractiveness of alternatives; each of these may hinder . 
discriminability since fewer alternatives can easily be eliminated Since discriminability is largely a 
function of the attribute set, the associated complexity is referred to as attribute-based complexity.” 
References: 
Timmemans, D. “The impact of task complexity on infomation use in multi-attribute decision making” 
Journal of Behavioural Decision Making vol. 6 (1993) pp. 95-1 11. 
Klein, N. M. and M. S .  Yadov. “Context effects on effort and accuracy in choice: an enquiry into adaptive 
decision making,” Journal of Consumer Research, 15 (1989) pp. 41 1-421. 
A widely employed framework (see, for example Timermans, 1993) relates complexity to the 
60 
“Johnson and Bruce (1997a) explore the extent to which complexity inhibits risky decision 
making and their results suggest that attribute-based complexity exerts a greater deterrent effect than 
alternative-based complexity.” 
References: 
Johnson, J. E. V. and A. C. Bruce. “An empirical study of the impact of complexity on participation in 
horserace betting” Journal of Gambling Studies 1997a (forthcoming) 
based complexity increases.” 
Johnson, J. E. V. and A. C. Bruce. “A probit model for estimating the effect of complexity on risk taking” 
Psvcholopical Reports 1997b (forthcoming) 
The results of the current study are as follows. “The results suggest that the size of risk, 
measured by stake is not influenced by either attribute-or alternative-based complexity. Generally the 
results support the notion of a propensity to accept greater degrees of risk as complexity increases. 
However the results suggest that the size of risk accepted is not affected by complexity but that attribute- 
and alternative- based complexity influence the absolute and relative risk accepted in an interactive 
manner. In addition, the propensity to accept absolute or relative risk is affected jointly by the level of 
Johnson and Bruce, 1997b “suggests that risk taking decreases as both alternative-and attribute- 
attribute-based complexity and whether a risk-hedging mechanism is employed” 3 
46 Chris Blood 
Naval Health Research Center in San Diego 
(619) 553 8386 
Telephone interview by Jacobs 
Name suggested by J Halbert. Dr. Blood is leader of working group 23 at MORS to be held in 
Monterey. His organization has done work on battlefield attrition of US forces in combat. As part of this 
they have tried to make some estimates of soft factors in combat outcomes. They assembled a subject 
matter panel. Attempting to assess horizontal bonding in the organization. Under the assumption the a 
homogeneous force is more cohesive, they used United Nations books to assess religious homogeneity in 
societies; ethnic homogeneity in societies; technical sophistication; and percent of GNP spent on defense. 
These assessments went into a model called FORCAZ to project battlefield attrition for US forces. 
Soft Factors in Combat 
Jerry Halbert (804) 980 7560 
National Ground Intelligence Center 
Address: 
220 Seventh Street 
N. E. Charlottesville VA 22902 
NGIC 
Attn: IANG-RAS (Halbert) 
Telephone Interview 4/20/1998 by P. Jacobs 
41 
61 
The National Ground Intelligence Center analyses intelligence of foreign countries; technical 
intelligence and military intelligence. 
Some time ago there was a study of the of weapon acquisition potential by countries for the next 
20 years. More recently there have been studies to evaluate factors that bear on the ability of countries to 
use the equipment; e.g. If a country purchased a long-range gun, did they also purchase the targeting 
equipment that would allow them to use the long range? 
plus 2 other people form a consensus rating score for each factor. The scales are not consistent over 
different studies; e.g. a score of 5 is not midway on the scale of 1 to 10. 
reflected by the other factors; e.g. the country has recently had 30 years of civil war. 
Each soft factor has a description that is a rating on a scale from 1 to 10. The author of the study 
One of the factors is the “wild card” battlefield performance; this factor reflects attributes not 
Another factor is leadership. 
Janet Morrow. Head of Modeling and Simulation at the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). 48 
Telephone interview, (804) 980 7393, on 4/21/98 by Jacobs. 
Have experts assess soft factors of combat; e.g. the level of training; morale. There is a reference scale i 
from 1 to 10. Each number has criteria mmciated it. Some of the criteria are measurable. They keep 
refining the criteria. She does not know of anyone that is working on representing soft factors in combat 
models. 
She recommends the book by Janis and Mann and the work by Tversky and his colleagues. A case study 
of bad decision making is a book about Pearl Harbor. 
Prange, G. W., D. M. Goldstein, and K. V. Dillon. At Dawn We Sleot: The Untold Stow of Pearl Harbor. 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1981. 
Blood, C. G., D. Rotblatt, and J. S .  Marks. “Incorporating adversary-specific adjustments into the 
FORECAS ground casualty projection model,” Technical Document 96-105, Naval Health Research 
Center, P.O. Box 85122, San Diego, CA 92186-5122. 
“The FORECAS ground casualty projection system is an interactive tool designed to provide 
medical requirements specialists with estimates of the number of casualties that may be incurred during 
various combat scenarios. The projections provided by the system include wounded in action, killed in 
action, and disease and non-battle injury incidence for US Marine forces. Estimates are needed for 
medical resource planning. 
The present report describes efforts to refine casualty rate projections by examining 
societalkultural factors and weapons inventories. 
Subject Matter Experts (SME) with backgrounds in casualty rate estimation were recruited to 
participate on a panel quantifying human factors adjustments to the baseline casualty estimates. The 
panel reached consensus on nine variables that would impact battlefield performance. The factors 
generally fall into the categories of 1) Technical Sophistication, 2) Group Cohesion, and 3) Armed Forces 
wide Esprit de Corps 
Technical Sophistication is measured by electrical consumption per capita. Electrical 
consumption per capita was computed as thousand metric tons of coal equivalent/population. 
49 
Group cohesion is measured by overall societal homogeneity. Ethnic homogeneity and religious 
Battlefield experience, military tradition, and troop commitment influence armed forces-wide 
homogeneity measured societal homogeneity. 
esprit de corps. Number of engagements within the last 10 years and number of engagements in the last 
25 years measured battlefield experience. In the military tradition subcategory, the variables of combat 
success percentage and combat history were judged to have varying influences on the fighting spirit of a 
force. Two variables that measure troop commitment were the length of conscription and national 
defense spending priority. 
factors by assigning each factor a number between 1 and 7 denoting it contribution to battlefield 
performance. The panel also agreed to weightings to combine information between countries. A 
composite factor for each country was determined.” 
Some details of the forecasting system‘are given in C. G. Blood, J. “M. Zouris, and D. Rotblatt “Using the 
ground forces casualty forecasting system (FORECAS) to project casualty sustainment” Report No. 97- 
39, Naval Health Research Center, P.O. Box 85 122, San Diego, CA 92186-5 122. 
previous conflicts. 
Each member of the SME panel ranked each factor’s importance, overall and relative to other 
The model is a time series model that appears to be specified by looking at casualty data from ., e 
Bond, M. H. and P. B. Smith. “Cross-cultural social and organizational psychology,” Annual Review of 50 
PSvChOlo~v, 47 (1996) pp. 205-35. 
“Leadership: The general functions that effective leaders must carry out appear to be universal. 
Managerial Decision Making: Managers in individualistic societies tend to handle events based 
Negotiation: Members in collectivist societies are more competitive with out-groups than are 
The specific ways in which these functions are expressed differs. 
more on their own experience than managers in collectivist societies. 
members of individualist cultures. Negotiating behavior is influenced both by variations in 
individualism-collectivism and by specific situational demands. Collectivists may regard long term links 
as a more important success criterion than short-term payoff.” 
51 Yates, J. F., J-W. Lee, and H. Shinotsuka. “Beliefs about overconfidence, including its cross-national 
variation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65 (1996) pp. 138-147. 
answers to a general knowledge question and then state a probability that the selected response is correct. 
People often exhibit overconfidence in this task; (the subjects’ average probability judgments exceed the 
proportion of items they answer correctly). Such overconfidence is stronger in most Asian countries than 
in Western countries. An empirical study demonstrated that subjects in both Taiwan and the United 
States typically expect cross-national variations to be the opposite of those that actually occur. It also 
showed that dominant lay theories for overconfidence rest exclusively on factors such as inflated self- 
appraisals. 
Research has shown that overconfidence in one’s general knowledge is subject to a number of 
factors. The most commonly discussed is item difficulty. Overconfidence is most pronounced for 
difficult questions, ones that are answered correctly by relatively few people. In contrast, overconfidence 
“A commonly used judgment research task requires the subject to choose among alternative 
63 
typically diminishes, and even turn into underconfidence for very easy items; questions that almost 
everyone answers correctly. 
The results of an experiment indicated that Mainland Chinese were far more overconfident than 
Americans. Another study indicated that Japanese subjects’ judgments were virtually indistinguishable 
from Americans. 
The current paper used student subjects in Taiwan (Chinese) and the United States and asked in 
what country they would expect overconfidence. Students in both countries expected overconfidence in 
the United States. The Taiwanese Chinese subjects were about twice as likely as the Americans to expect 
Taiwanese to display overconfidence. 
even self-effacement-is more common in Asia than in the US. Such modesty manifests itself in practical 
situations, too. In the US, self appraisals of job performance are almost always more lenient than those of 
the employee’s supervisors. A study found exactly the opposite among Chinese workers and supervisors 
in Taiwan. 
There are important reasons why we should expect more modesty among Asians. Many Asian 
societies place a premium on interpersonal harmony, which is enhanced by self-effacement. Considerable 
data indicate that self esteem in an individualistic society is enhanced when one sees him or herself as 
distinct-in particular, better than others. In contrast, in a collectivistic society, self esteem is facilitated by 
adherence to the norm that one should “fit in”. 
There are growing indications fih other directions that intuitively appealing self-esteem 
explanations of overconfidence in general knowledge are deficient. It appears that although self esteem 
mechanisms might underlie many self-appraisals, they do not explain overconfidence in general 
knowledge. Explanations of general knowledge overconfidence are the topic of active debate.” 
There is a fair amount of cross-cultural personality research indicating that personal modesty- 
Kaplan, M. “Cultural ergonomics: an evolving focus for military human factors.” In Reuven Gal and A. 52 
David Mangelsdorff (Eds.) Handbook of Militam Psvcholony, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1991. 
Shouksmith, G. and S .  Burrough. “Job stress factors for New Zealand and Canadian air traffic 
controllers,” ADDlied Psvchologv: an International Review, 37 (1988) pp. 263-270. 
Breznitz, S .  and Y. Eshel. “Life events: stressful ordeal or valuable experience?” In S .  Breznitz 
(Ed), Stress in Israel, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 1983. 
Shalit, B. The Psvcholonv of Conflict and Combat, Praeger, New York, 1988. 
Rachman, S .  J. “Fear and courage in bomb disposal operators,” Advances in Behavior Research 
Rachman, S. J. “Psychological analysis of courageous performance in military personnel,” 
and TheraDy, 4 (1983) pp. 99-164. 
Contract DNA 45-83-C-0028 (in progress). European Science Coordination Office US Army Research 
Institute, 1989. 
US Army Research Institute, Alexandria VA, 1987. 
Braun, P., D. Wiegand, and H. Aschenbrenner. “The assessment of complex skills and of personality 
characteristics in military services.” In Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff (Eds.) Handbook of 
Military Psychology, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1991. 
Lord, R. G., C. De Vader, and G. M. AUiger. “A meta-analysis of the relation between personality traits 
and leadership perceptions,” J. of Amlied Psvcholony, 71 (1986) pp. 402-410. 
Stewart, N. K. “South Atlantic conflict of 1982: a case study in military cohesion,” (draft report), 
64 
Winter, D. G., A. J. Stewart, L. E Duncan, 0. P. John, and E. C. Klohnen. “Traits and motives: toward 
an integration of two traditions in personality research,” Psvchological Review, 105 (1998) pp. 230-250. 
motive (as measured by the Thematic Apperception Test [TAT] or other imaginative verbal behavior), the 
authors suggest that these 2 concepts reflect 2 fundamentally different elements of personality- 
conceptually distinct and empirically unrelated. The authors propose that traits and motives interact in the 
prediction of behavior: Traits channel the behavioral expression of motives throughout the life course. 
The authors illustrate this interactive hypothesis in 2 longitudinal studies, focusing on the broad trait of 
extraversion and the 2 social motives of affiliation and power. Extraversion facilitates unconflicted 
motive expression, whereas introversion deflects social motives away from their characteristic goals and 
creates difficulties in goal attainment.” 
53 
“After reviewing classic and current conceptions of trait (as measured by questionnaires) and 
54 Ackerman, P. L. and E. D. Heggestad. “Intelligence, personality, and interests: evidence for 
overlapping traits,” Psvchological Bulletin, 121 (1997) pp. 219-245. 
The authors review theories of intelligence, personality and interest as a means to establish 
potential overlap. “Evaluations of relations among personality construct, vocational interests and * 
intellectual abilities lead them to proposethat the development of personality-interest-intelligence traits 
proceeds along mutually causal lines; that is abilities, interests, and personality develop in tandem. 
Gf: fluid intelligence: sequential reasoning, inductive reasoning, quantitative reasoning,. . . 
Gc: crystallized intelligence: verbal comprehension, lexical knowledge, foreign language,. . . 






TIE: Typical intellectual engagement is a self report measure of personality developed by Goff and 
Ackerman The measure shows association with openness to experience. It does not show association 
with Gf’ 
55 Ghosh, D. and M. R. Ray. “Risk, ambiguity and decision choice: some additional evidence,” Decision 
Sciences, 28 (1997) pp. 81-104. 
determine choice behavior The presence of ambiguity may often be interpreteflperceived as risk 
Decision makers who are less risk averse and have more tolerance for ambiguity display greater 
confidence in their choice. Individuals with a low tolerance for ambiguity may interpret lack of 
information or lack of precise information as risk and take action that incurs cost without yielding benefit. 
Risk seeking and ambiguity tolerant individuals may take no action where such action may be necessary.” 
exploratory investigation” Decision Sciences vol. 23 pp43 1-444. 
Reports results of experiments using MBA students. “Both risk attitude and ambiguity intolerance 
Ghosh, D. and Ray, M. R. (1992) “Risk attitude, ambiguity intolerance, and decision making: an 
65 
Hogarth, R. M. (1989) “Ambiguity in competitive decision making: some implications and tests” 
In P.C. Fishbum and I. Lavelle (Eds.) Annals of Ouerations Research vol. 19 pp31-50. 
Atwater, L. E., S .  D. Dionne, B. J. Avolio, J. F. Camobreco, and A. W. Lau. “Leader attributes and 
behaviors predicting emergence of leader effectiveness,” Technical report 1044, United States Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, July 1996. 
“Data was gathered concerning a sample of cadets/students over the course of their education and 
military training at a state military college (Virginia Military Institute). The primary purpose was to track 
longitudinally leader development and emergence and to identify individual characteristic and leadership 
behaviors that differentiated the leadership position and leadership effectiveness attained by the cadets. 
The study sought to identify the individual characteristics and leadership behaviors that differentiated the 
leadership positions and leadership effectiveness achieved by the students as college seniors. 
Military Academy (USMA) and the US Army Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences conduct 
programmatic research on Army-wide priorities in the areas of organizational leadership and leader 
education, training an development. The CLOR’s major research effort is known as Leadership 
development of a longitudinal database as a capability for understanding the leadership development 
process. LEAD 21 involves the creation of a longitudinal database, begun with the USMA cadets in the 
Class of 1998, which will allow a description of changes in leadership behavior with organizational 
progression, as well as identification of hperiences contributing to progressive leader development. 
personality traits to various leader effectiveness or performance measures” 
References: 
56 
The Center for Leadership and organizations Research (CLOR), jointly established by the US 
Education and Development for the 21a Century (LEAD21). The overall goal of LEAD21 is * 
Early studies of leadership emergence and effectiveness concentrated on linking leader 
Bass, B. M. Bass & Stoadill’s Handbook of Leadership. Free Press, New York, 1990. 
YuM, G. A. Leadership in Organizations. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ, 1994. 
“Generally, clusters of characteristics seemed to differentiate effective from ineffective leaders, though no 
specific trait or characteristic could be deemed essential. Among the characteristics found to be of clear 
consequence to leadership were cognitive ability, conscientiousness, self-confidence, energy/activity 
level, values, and tolerance for stress. (Bass (1990)) Lord, Devader and Niger  (1986) in their meta- 
analysis review of the leader trait literature concluded that traits did account for appreciable variance in 
leadership perceptions. They found that aggregate correlation between intelligence and leadership was 
0.50. Lord and Hall (1992) argued that cognitive ability levels determine the extent to which leaders are 
more successful at anticipating and recognizing problems, thus improving their ability to influence 
others. ” 
References: 
Lord, R. G., C. De Vader, and G. M. ALliger. “A meta-analysis of the relation between personality traits 
and leadership perceptions,” J. of Amlied Psychology, 71 (1986) pp. 402410. 
Lord, R. G. and R. J. Hall. “Contemporary views of leadership and individual differences,” Leadership 
“The report contains a literature review of various individual characteristics and leader 
m, 3 (1992) pp. 137-157. 
effectiveness. It also talks about assessment of traits and interpersonal behaviors. For example the 
California Psychological Inventory (CPI) was developed to assess traits and interpersonal behaviors that 
arise from and operate in the domain of the social environment. 
The report uses analysis of variance to assess associations between individual characteristics and 
the final military rank of the students graduating from VMI. Standard errors of means are never reported. 
The most important individual difference characteristics were physical fitness, self-esteem, cognitive 
ability, prior influence experiences and conscientiousness.” 
Avolio, B. J., S. Dionne, L. Atwater, A. Lau, J. Camobreco, N. Whitmore, andB. Bass. “Antecedent 
predictors of a ‘full range’ of leadership and management styles,” Technical Report 1040, United States 
Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, March 1996. 
“Report provides the results of research examining the relationship between antecedent measures 
of focal cadet personality, ability, temperament, interpersonal style, experience, and physical fitness with 
rating of leadership collected from multiple sources (subordinate and superior) over two time periods. 
The primary purpose of the research reported is to assess the characteristics that differentiate cadets rated 
as transformational versus those who are rated as exhibiting less active and/or passive corrective styles of 
leadership and management.” Data were collected at Virginia Military Institute (VMI). 
51 
3 
Spector, P. E. and B. J. O’Connell. “The contribution of personality traits, negative affectivity, locus of 
control and type A to the subsequent r e p w  of job stressors and job strains,” Journal of OccuDational and 
Organizational Psychology, 67 (1994) pp..1-11. 
“Negative affectivity locus of control and type A personality have all been suggested as playing 
an important role in the job stress domain. Negative affectivity (NA) is defined as the tendency for an 
individual to experience a variety of negative emotions across time and situations. Locus of control is a 
personality variable that concerns people’s generalized expectancies that they can or cannot control 
reinforcements in their lives. People who hold expectancies that they control reinforcements are 
considered to be internals, and people who hold expectancies that outside forces or luck controls 
reinforcements are considered to be externals. There are two aspects to type A personality: impatience- 
initability and achievement striving.” 
Paper reports results of a study assessing a cohort of graduating college seniors while in school 
and again after graduating and beginning a job. The results show that personality relates to incumbent 
reports of job stressors and strains. 
Reference: 
Ganster, D.C. (1986). “Type A behavior and occupational stress” Journal of Organizational Behavior 
Management vol. 8 pp61-84. 
58 
Robertson, I. T. and A. Kinder. “Personality and job competencies: the criterion-related validity of 
some personality variables,” Journal of OccuDational and Organizational Psychology, 66 (1993) pp. 225- 
244. 
Results of a study to assess the criterion-related validity of some personality variables are 
reported. 
The study uses the Occupational Personality Questionnaire (OPQ; Saville and Holdsworth 1990). 
The instrument is the result of efforts to produce self-report personality inventories focused on 




Bamck, M. R. and Mount, M. K. (1991) “The big five personality dimensions and job performance: a 
meta-analysis” Personnel Psvchology vol. 44  ppl-26 
Saville, P. and Holdsworth (1990) Occupational Personality Questionnaire Manual. Echer, Surrey: Saville 
&Holds worth. 
Tett, R. P., Jackson. D. N. and Rothstein, M. (1991) “Personality measures as predictors of job 
performance: a meta-analytic review” Personnel Psvchologv vol. 44 pp703-742. 
@ Lord, R. G. and R. J. Hall. “Contemporary views of leadership and individual differences,” LeadershiD 
Ouarterly, 3 (1992) pp. 137-157. 
“There is a need for an effective method for measuring leadership behavior. This report considers 
the Cadet Performance Report (CPR). CPR is a 12-dimensional leadership behavior rating system 
currently used to develop and evaluate the leadership performance of USMA cadets. The report examines 
the use of CPR to measure cadet leadership behavior. 
The US Army has conducted research on defining and measuring leadership effectiveness. Three 
classification systems are particularly relevant for understanding leadership in the Army context. The 9 
Center for Army Leadership (CAL) hwidentified nine leadership competencies representing the 
performance requirements of leaders throughout the US Army. Two other systems were developed to 
classify the leadership behaviors involved in precommissioning education and training. They are the 
leadership Assessment Program (LAP), a sixteen-dimensional taxonomy used in the reserve Officer 
Training Corps (ROTC) and the Cadet Performance Report (CPR), a twelve-dimensional leadership 
behavior rating system employed by the US Military Academy at West Point, NY 
This study evaluates the reasonableness CPR as a measure.” 
61 Driskell, J. E. and E. Salas. “Overcoming the effects of stress on military performance: human factors, 
training, and selection strategies.” In Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff (Eds.) Handbook of 
Military Psvchology, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1991. 
Kahan, J. P., N. Webb, R. J. Shavelson, and R. M. Stolzenberg. “Individual characteristics and unit 
performance,” The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA, 1985. 
“It does not appear promising to use personality measures to predict unit effectiveness.” 
Hogan, J., R. Hogan, and S. Briggs. “Psychological and physical performance factors associated 
with attrition in explosive ordinance disposal training,” (Report No. UY-loo), Office of Naval Research, 
Arlington VA, 1984. 
stress resistance given the scarcity of reliable measures of stress proneness or stress vulnerability.” 
Personalitv and Social Psvchologv, 9 (1987) pp. 91-1 12. 
“It is difficult to discover consistent relationships between personality variables and 
Driskell, J. E., Hogan, R. and Salas, E.. “Personality and group performance,” Review of 
“There are many different definitions of personality.” 
Dixon, N. On the Psychologv of Militarv IncomDetence. Basic Books, New York, 1976. 
Jaques, E., S .  Clement, C. Rigby, and T. 0. Jacobs. Senior leadership performance requirements at the 
executive level. US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria VA, 
1986. 
“Findings based on interviews of 41 general officers. Single skill most often mentioned 
was consensus building (convince subordinates from other services; convince others to provide necessary 
assets; ensures that successors will continue the effort); make decisions without full information; have to 
deal with complexity and uncertainty” 
I 
Isenberg (1985) (D. J. Isenberg (1985) “Some hows and whats of managerial thinking: implications for 
future army leaders” in J. G. Hunt and J. D. Blair (Eds.), LeadershiD on the future battlefield. Washington: 
Pergamon Press)” describes observation of six senior managers. They create new alternatives, keep 
options open, delay decision points, search for more information, and include more people in the 
decision-making function. They do not solve problems; they focus on defining them so solutions could 
be found. Have a high tolerance for ambiguity and perceived and understood novelty.” 
McGregor, L., M. Eveleigh, J. C. S yler, and S. F. Davis. “Self-perception of personality characteristics 63 
and the type A behavior pattern,” Bulletin of the Psvchonomic Society, 29 (1991) pp. 320-322. 
“The type A behavior pattern has been characterized by the following traits: 
A sense of time urgency 
Competitive achievement striving 
High levels of aggressiveness and/or free-floating hostility 
In contrast, Type B individuals are defined by the relative absence of these Type A characteristics. 
control over the surrounding environment. Any situation that is perceived as a threat to the individual’s 
control results in an intensification of tlyse mechanisms. Glass (1977) demonstrated that Type A 
individuals displayed greater reactions than did Type Bs to uncontrollable events that were very salient, 
whereas the opposite was true for events of low salience.” 
Reference: 
Glass, D. (1977) Behavior Dattems, stress, and coronary disease Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 
All Type A characteristics are seen as mechanisms by which the individual attempts to maintain + 
“Type A individuals displayed greater impairment on a task requiring a response delay than did 
Type Bs. The type A subjects consistently overestimated the passage of time and responded before the 
delay interval had timed out.” 
Reference: 
Glass, D., Snyder, M., and Hollis, J. (1974) “Time urgency and the Type A coronary-prone behavior ‘ 
pattern” vol. 10 pp284-300. 
“Type A adults were shown to be significantly more aggressive than Type Bs when provoked by an 
annoying confederate or by a frustrating task”: 
Reference: 
Carver, C. S. and Glass, D. C. (1978) “Coronary-prone behavior pattern and interpersonal aggression” 
Journal of Personalitv and Social Psvcholonv Vol. 36 pp. 361-366. 
“To continue a tiring but challenging task, Type A individuals have repeatedly suppressed fatigue 
and performed closer to their endurance levels than Type B”: 
Reference: 
Carver, C. S . ,  Coleman, A. E., and Glass D. C. (1976) “Coronary-prone behavior pattern and the 
suppression of fatigue on a treadmill test” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Vol. 33 pp. 460- 
466. 
“Extreme Type A individuals display higher death anxiety and manifest anxiety scores than did 
type B individuals”: 
Reference: 
Tramill, J. L., Kleinhammer-Tramill, P. J., Davis, S. F. and Parks, C. S .  (1985)”The relationship between 
Type A and Type B behaviors and level of self-esteem” Psychological Record vol. 35 pp323-327. 
, The authors studied undergraduate college students. 
a Byrne D. G. and M. I. Reinhart. “Work characteristics, occupational achievement and the type A 
behavior pattern,” Journal of OccuDational Psvcholony, 62 (1989) pp. 123-134. 
“Study of people in Australian Public Service. Type A behavior pattern is associated with more 
working weeks/year, more discretionary work hours/week and more days/ year spent on occupation- 
related travel. This time commitment is instrumental in facilitating occupational achievement among 
those with a type A behavior pattern.” 
- 
., .h 
Hunt, R G., F. J. Krzystofiak, J. R. Meindl, and A. M. Yousry. “Cognitive style and decision making,” 65 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 44 (1989) pp. 436-453. 
Individuals showing high field independence were thought to prefer problem solving approaches which 
emphasize detail and basic relationships. The field dependent person shows less ability (or perhaps less 
inclination) to separate objects from their environment. Field dependent individuals would prefer more 
global, perhaps intuitive, approaches to problem solving.” 
“Field independence is the ability to separate an object or phenomenon from its environment. 
Above quote from 
Henderson, J. C. and P. C. Nutt. “The influence of decision style on decision-making behavior,” 
Management Science, 26 (1980) pp. 371-386. 
“A related set of categories contrast “analytic” and “intuitive” individuals. The analytic 
individual is seen as concentrating on detail and thus as breaking that which is observed into component 
parts. In contrast the intuitive individual comprehends the field as an integrated whole.” 
“McKenny and Keen (1974) have both an information-gathering and an information-evaluation 
dimension of style. The information-gathering dimension differentiates receptive, data-sensitive (i.e. 
analytic) individuals from perceptive data-filtering (i.e. intuitive) individuals. The information-evaluation 
dimension differentiates systematic structured decision makers (i.e. analytic) from holistic, trial and error 
(i.e. intuitive) problem solvers. Combination of the two dimensions results in four cognitive styles: 
systematic-perceptive, systematic-receptive, intuitive-perceptives and intuitive-receptives.” 
’ 
- References: 
McKenny, J. and P. Keen. “How managers’ minds work,” Harvard Business Review, 52 (1974) 




Mitroff, I. I. “Archetypal social systems analysis: on the deeper structure of human systems,” 
Academy of Management Review, 8 (1983) pp. 387-397. 
“Based on a Jungian scheme Mitroff (1983) utilized a similar classification scheme which 
recognized that individuals differ in the way that they acquire information and in the methods that they 
use to process data. The information-acquisition dimension differentiates individuals who are sensation- 
oriented ( S )  from those who are intuition-oriented (I). The sensation-oriented information acquirer 
prefers structured problems which involve routine and detail while the intuitive prefers structured 
problems which involve routine and detail while the intuitive prefers structured problems which involve 
routine and detail while the intuitive prefers unstructured problems. The information-evaluation 
dimension differentiates those individuals who adopt a thinking(T) approach when evaluating information 
from those who adopt a feeling (F) approach. Again these dimensions are seen as being independent and 
thus, combine to produce four basic composite styles: Sensation-Thinking (ST), Sensation-Feeling (SF), 
Intuition-Thinking (NT), and Intuition-Feeling (NF). Each individual is thought to be predominantly of 
one type. 
The research reported in Hunt et al. (1989) concentrates on sharply contrasting “analytics” and 
“intuitives”. Analytics are people who, for example when gathering information tend to be attentive to 
detail whereas Intuitives focus on patterns; and when evaluating information, analytics define the quality 
of a solution largely in terms of the method whereas Intuitives defend a solution in terms of “fit”” (cf. f 
Keen, P. G. W. (1973) The Imihations of cognitive stvle for Individual Decision Making 
“Behling, Gifford and Tolliver-(4980) found intuitives to be more risk prone than sensers in a 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration. 
betting situation. Henderson and Nutt (1980) found that Sensation-Thinking (ST) styles were associated 
with a greater degree of risk aversion than were Sensation-Feeling (SF) styles. Second, Keen (1973) 
provided evidence that the dimensions of cognitive style are not empirically independent. Systematic 
subjects were more likely to be thinking information evaluators and intuitives were more likely to be 
feeling.” 
References: 
Behling, O., W. E. Gifford, and J. M. Tolliver. “Effects of grouping information on decision 
making under risk,” Decision Sciences, 1 1 (1980) pp. 272-283. 
“A simple schematic model of decision making would conceive of it in terms of three interacting 
components: the decision maker, the task, and the decision context or situation. 
Hypothesis: Expressed or preferred decision strategies will vary as a function of the decision 
maker’s ’cognitive style. 
Procedure: The short form of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Ml3T.I) was used to determine the 
cognitive style. A standardized decision task was simulated in the form of a case designed in accord with 
a specific model of decision processes. In it different pairs of specialists, differing in style, gave advice to 
a company’s head about how to handle a strategic issue confronting the fm. Subjects were asked to 
choose one from each pair of advisors, in each of three consecutive meetings, representing stages of the 
decision process. It was expected that a subject having a particular style would choose advisors 
expressive of the same style. 
type (intuitive in one dimension and analytic in the other) 
Authors use analytic (both dimensions analytic) intuitive (both dimensions intuitive) mixed in 
72 
The Bahl-Hunt model divides decision making into four distinct features: 1) a definition of the 
situation in the form of a cognitive “model”; 2) a set of alternatives; 3) the selection of a choice; and 4) an 
overt action.” 
The authors found some associations of the type they were expecting 
Reference: 
systems” Information and Management vol. 7 pp121-131. 
Bahl, H. C. and Hunt, R. G. (1984) “A framework for systems analysis for decision support 
Janis, I. L. Crucial Decisions. The Free Press, New York, NY, 1989. 66 
“A main goal of book is to address the following questions: When and why do leaders of large 
organizations make avoidable errors that result in faulty policy decisions? How can such errors be 
prevented or at least kept to a minimum. 
The steps of vigilant problem solving to make decisions: 
Formulate the problem: what are the requirements; direction of solution? 
Use informational resources: prior information and new information; h 
c 
Analyse and reformulate the problem: additions or changes to requirements? Additional 
Evaluate and select an alternative; 
Decide after adequate search, appraisal, and planning; 
Bolster the decision by playing up the advantages and playing down the disadvantages; solicit 
alternatives? Additional information n d e d ?  
supportive information; announce decision to interested parties; promote the decision. 
Assumptions: 
determinants of a successful outcome. 
The quality of the procedures used to amve at a fundamental policy decision is one of the major 
Most leaders are capable of carrying out procedures needed for high quality decision making. 
Policy makers make no effort to use high quality procedures to make decisions they regard aS 
In important policy decisions a few constraints will dominate the thinking. 
unimportant 
Factors influencing policymakers judgments on the importance of a potential problem: 
It is important if there is a large discrepancy between the existing and desired state of affairs. 
It is important if the new problem is viewed as linked to a problem already being worked on. 
The total number of important problems already being worked on 
General tendency to ignore threats that develop gradually rather than precipitately. 
An unambiguous threat that arises without any prior warning requires more than standard 
How serious a decision maker becomes about an emerging threat depends on how familiar the 
operating procedures and decision rules. 
policymaker is with the type of danger to which a valid warning refers. 
73 
When managers believe that the complexities of the issues exceed their capabilities or the 
organization lacks adequate resources for working out a high-quality solution to a problem they judge to 
be very important, they will make a crucial policy decision by “the seat-of-their pants” without bothering 
to examine carefully the pertinent information that is readily available, 
Cognitive Decision rule: 
minimal requirements without bothering to compare it with other viable alternatives. 
Role of personality in leadership: 
about the interaction of personality and situational factors have as yet emerged. 
Five potential factors to describe major features of personality 
versus lax. 
variety versus preference for routine. 
Satisficing: Accept the first alternative that comes to mind that is “good enough” to meet the 
At present the role of personality in leadership is in the doldrums because few generalizations 
Conscientiousness-well organized versus disorganized; careful versus careless; self-disciplined 
Openness-imaginative versus down to earth; independent versus conforming, preference for 
Neuroticism-worrying versus calm; insecure versus secure; self-pitying versus self-satisfied. 
Agreeableness-considerate versus ruthless; trusting versus suspicious; helpful versus 




Hypotheses concerning factors associated with poor decision making 
Minimize importance of major challenging threats: 
Chronic lack of conscientiousness; 
Chronic lack of openness: lack of imagination, failure to think and act independently and 
preference for routine; 
Calm, cool detached coping style in response to fear-arousing events or communications; 
Chronic optimism concerning the organization’s stability and vulnerability; 
high stress tolerance tends to make people relatively unresponsive to serious warnings; 
Overreaction to information: 
Low self confidence, including chronic sense of low self-efficacy; 
Chronic pessimism Concerning organization’s ability to supply the resources essential for 
solving complicated policy problems, with supporting beliefs about internal weaknesses that preclude 
adaptive changes; 
Overreaction to social Pressures: 
Chronically strong need for social approval; 
Strong need for power and status: 
Chronic apprehensiveness about ruthlessness of other powerholders in the organization 
with supporting beliefs about their readiness to inflict retaliations; 
High dependency upon a cohesive group of fellow executives for social support; 
74 
Egocentric constraints by arousing strong personal motives: 
Chronic lack of conscientiousness; 
Persistent negativism or hostility toward the organization with supporting beliefs about 
undesirable features that make it undeserving of loyalty; 
Overreaction to information by arousing anxiety or other emotional reactions: 
Low stress tolerance-manifested by relatively high level of anxiety with feelings of 
Lack of perceived control over outcomes and other components of a low level of 
Persistent ambivalence toward the organization such that it is seen as having positive 
helplessness and vulnerability; 
personality hardiness; 
features that make it deserving of loyalty but is also seen as having negative features that make it weak 
and vulnerable; 
Habitual externalized anger-coping style; 
Persistent hostility toward major opponents, with supporting beliefs about their evil and 
hostile intentions.” 
. . -. 
67 Ajzen, I. Attitudes, Personalitv, and B&avior. The Dorsey Press, Chicago IL, 1988. 
“We cannot construct a broad personality inventory or attitude scale and hope to use it as a basis 
for the prediction and explanation of any conceivable behavioral criterion. Too many factors unique to a 
given occasion prevent emergence of a clear behavior consistency. Broad response dispositions are poor 
predictors of specific actions. Both theory and empirical findings negate the possibility of using measures 
of general attitudes or personality traits to predict behavior.” 
Generally, observations of single actions on individual occasions do not correlate well with each other. 
However, aggregating observations of a given behavior across occasions can provide a measure of the 
disposition to perform the behavior in question 
Both theory and empirical findings negate the possibility of measuring general attitudes or personality 
traits and using the resulting scores to predict any single behavior under a set of circumstances. 
The author describes a theory of planned behavior: Attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control are the three primary determinants of intentions. Intentions are influenced 
by beliefs about the behavior’s likely outcomes; beliefs about the expectations of important others; beliefs 
about the factors that may facilitate or hinder performance of the behavior. The theory of planned 
behavior is designed to permit prediction and explanation of behavioral achievement by taking into 
account motivational antecedents, reflected in intentions, as well as other factors that are only partly 
under volitional control that are reflected in perceived behavioral control. 
Streufert, S. “Individual differences in risk taking,” J. of Amlied Social Psvcholom, 16,(1986) pp. 482- 68 
497. 
highly adverse consequences: attributes are type 
“Investigated personality traits that resulted in the likelihood to adopt risky actions with 
75 
A (success driven, time driven competitive); high tolerance for incongruity between past experience and 
contemplated risks; and low cognitive complexity (less integrative multidimensional information 
processing) 
Personality characteristics of great leaders is sparse.” 
Suedfeld, P., R. S .  Corteen, and C. McCormick. “The role of integrative complexity in military 
leadership: Robert E. Lee and his opponents,” J. of Applied Social Psvchologv, 16 (1986) pp. 498-507. 
Huntford, R. Scott and Amundsen. Putnam, New York, 1980. 
“There is a mistrust reluctance and objections of higher ranks of military leadership to the formal 
introduction of personality factors in selection, advancement and placement at these ranks.” 
Sanders, G. S .  and F. S .  Malkis. “Type A behavior, need for control, and reactions to group 69 
participation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 30 (1982) pp. 71-86. 
“Type A behavior is characterized primarily by the combination of a highly competitive 
achievement orientation, a sense of time urgency, and excessive hostility in response to frustration. Type 
As seem to have a strong investment in demonstrating that they can deliberately cause desired 
presumed to underlie Type As concern with competition, their strong reaction to being thwarted by 
frustration, and their fear of missing deadlines or wasting time. Type A syndrome is not chronic but 
emerges primarily when the environment poses some threat to these individuals’ sense of control.” 
consequences-that is, they have a highneed for control. The desire to master their environment is * 
Experiment with student subjects. 
76 
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